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Punishing Artificial Intelligence: 
Legal Fiction or Science Fiction 
Ryan Abbott†* and Alex Sarch** 
Whether causing flash crashes in financial markets, purchasing illegal 
drugs, or running over pedestrians, AI is increasingly engaging in activity 
that would be criminal for a natural person, or even an artificial person like 
a corporation. We argue that criminal law falls short in cases where an AI 
causes certain types of harm and there are no practically or legally 
identifiable upstream criminal actors. This Article explores potential 
solutions to this problem, focusing on holding AI directly criminally liable 
where it is acting autonomously and irreducibly. Conventional wisdom 
holds that punishing AI is incongruous with basic criminal law principles 
such as the capacity for culpability and the requirement of a guilty mind. 
Drawing on analogies to corporate and strict criminal liability, as well 
as familiar imputation principles, we show how a coherent theoretical case 
can be constructed for AI punishment. AI punishment could result in general 
deterrence and expressive benefits, and it need not run afoul of negative 
limitations such as punishing in excess of culpability. Ultimately, however, 
punishing AI is not justified, because it might entail significant costs and it 
would certainly require radical legal changes. Modest changes to existing 
criminal laws that target persons, together with potentially expanded civil 
liability, are a better solution to AI crime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, an artist going by the moniker “Random Darknet Shopper” 
(RDS) purchased Ecstasy and a Hungarian passport for display in an art 
exhibit.1 This was part of a performance project where RDS was given 
$100 in the cryptocurrency bitcoin each week to make a purchase from 
an online marketplace. The items were then shipped to a Swiss art 
gallery and put on exhibit. After learning about the exhibit from social 
media, Swiss police took RDS into custody along with the purchases.2 
What makes this story interesting for our purposes is that RDS was 
an artificial intelligence (“AI”), and hardly the first to have a run-in with 
law enforcement.3 If RDS had been a natural person located in the 
United States, it could be criminally prosecuted under U.S. law.4 For 
that matter, entities involved in this activity other than RDS could also 
be criminally prosecuted, such as those supplying the bitcoin and 
hosting the exhibition.5 Luckily for RDS and crew, the Swiss authorities 
were art fans.6 
Cases like this will pose new challenges, including for criminal law 
doctrine.7 The RDS case may be relatively straightforward, but programs 
exist that are autonomous, decentralized, and “unstoppable.”8 What if 
 
 1 Arjun Kharpal, Robot with $100 Bitcoin Buys Drugs, Gets Arrested, CNBC (Apr. 
22, 2015, 5:09 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/21/robot-with-100-bitcoin-buys-
drugs-gets-arrested.html. 
 2 See id. 
 3 See Matt Novak, Was This the First Robot Ever Arrested?, GIZMODO (Feb. 18, 2014, 
12:00 PM), https://paleofuture.gizmodo.com/was-this-the-first-robot-ever-arrested-
1524686968 (describing police confiscation in 1982 of a robot: “The police considered 
citing [its owner] for failing to obtain a permit for advertising . . . but no charges were 
filed and the robot was ultimately returned.”). Robot encounters with law enforcement 
are becoming more common. See, e.g., Peter Dockrill, A Robot Was Just ‘Arrested’ by 
Russian Police, SCI. ALERT (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.sciencealert.com/a-robot-was-
just-arrested-by-russian-police. 
 4 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2019) (criminalizing distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance).  
 5 See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2019) (criminalizing aiding and abetting offenses). 
 6 Random Darknet Shopper was eventually returned to its creators together with 
all of the purchases except the Ecstasy. See Kharpal, supra note 1 (noting the 
prosecutor’s comment that “the possession of Ecstasy was indeed a reasonable means 
for the purpose of sparking public debate about questions related to the exhibition”). 
Apparently, the Hungarian passport was also returned. See id. 
 7 See Christopher Markou, We Could Soon Face a Robot Crimewave. . .The Law 
Needs to Be Ready, CONVERSATION (Apr. 11, 2017, 9:36 AM), https://theconversation. 
com/we-could-soon-face-a-robot-crimewave-the-law-needs-to-be-ready-75276. 
 8 See infra Part I.A (discussing The Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“The 
DAO”)).  
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RDS had been open source software that individuals from around the 
world independently helped program? What if RDS was instead 
“Random Shopper,” designed to purchase necessities for college dorms 
while relying on machine learning to improve? What if it had been 
initially programmed to only purchase items from Amazon, but learned 
from user content that some necessities could be purchased at lower 
cost from other websites, and that a broader understanding of 
“necessities” exists? If Random Shopper autonomously buys Ecstasy in 
a manner not reasonably foreseeable to its developers, should those 
individuals be criminally liable? For that matter, who should count as 
its developers, and which ones would be liable? Should its owners be 
liable, and what if it has no owners? Should its users be liable, and what 
if it has no users? Perhaps Random Shopper itself should be held 
criminally liable. 
The possibility of directly criminally punishing AI is receiving 
increased attention by the popular press and legal scholars alike.9 
Perhaps the best-known defender of punishing AI is Gabriel Hallevy. 
He contends that “[w]hen an AI entity establishes all elements of a 
specific offense, both external and internal, there is no reason to prevent 
imposition of criminal liability upon it for that offense.”10 In his view, 
“[i]f all of its specific requirements are met, criminal liability may be 
imposed upon any entity — human, corporate or AI entity.”11 Drawing 
on the analogy to corporations,12 Hallevy asserts that “AI entities are 
taking larger and larger parts in human activities, as do corporations,” 
and he concludes that “there is no substantive legal difference between 
the idea of criminal liability imposed on corporations and on AI 
entities.”13 “Modern times,” he contends, “warrant modern legal 
 
 9 See, e.g., Gabriel Hallevy, The Punishibility of Artificial Intelligence Technology, in 
LIABILITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 185-229 (2014); J.K.C. 
Kingston, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Liability, in RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS XXXIII: INCORPORATING APPLICATIONS AND INNOVATIONS IN 
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS XXIV 269 (Max Bramer & Miltos Petridis eds., 2016), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07782.pdf; Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, 69 
S.C. L. REV. 579, 580 (2018); Jeffrey Wale & David Yuratich, Robot Law: What Happens 
If Intelligent Machines Commit Crimes?, CONVERSATION (July 1, 2015, 8:06 AM), 
http://theconversation.com/robot-law-what-happens-if-intelligent-machines-commit-
crimes-44058; infra Part I.A (discussing The DAO). 
 10 Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities — From 
Science Fiction to Legal Social Control, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 171, 191 (2010). 
 11 Id. at 199. 
 12 See id. at 200 (asking why AI entities should be treated “different from 
corporations”).  
 13 Id. at 200-01. 
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measures.”14 More recently, Ying Hu has subjected the idea of criminal 
liability for AI to philosophical scrutiny and made a case “for imposing 
criminal liability on a type of robot that is likely to emerge in the 
future,” insofar as they may employ morally sensitive decision-making 
algorithms.15 Her arguments likewise draw heavily on the analogy to 
corporate criminal liability.16 
In contrast to AI punishment expansionists like Hallevy and Hu, 
skeptics might be inclined to write off the idea of punishing AI from the 
start as conceptual confusion — akin to hitting one’s computer when it 
crashes. If AI is just a machine, then surely the fundamental concepts 
of the criminal law like culpability — a “guilty mind” that is 
characterized by insufficient regard for legally protected values17 — 
would be misplaced. One might think the whole idea of punishing AI 
can be easily dispensed with as inconsistent with basic criminal law 
principles.  
The idea of punishing AI is due for fresh consideration. This Article 
takes a measured look at the proposal, informed by theory and practice 
alike. We argue punishment of AI cannot be categorically ruled out. 
Harm caused by a sophisticated AI may be more than a mere accident 
where no wrongdoing is implicated. Some AI-generated harms may 
stem from difficult-to-reduce behaviors of an autonomous system, 
 
 14 Id. at 199. 
 15 Ying Hu, Robot Criminals, 52 MICH. J.L. REFORM 487, 531 (2019); see also id. at 
490 (“[A]n argument can be made for robot criminal liability, provided that the robot 
satisfies three threshold conditions . . . . [T]he robot must be (1) equipped with 
algorithms that can make nontrivial morally relevant decisions; (2) capable of 
communicating its moral decisions to humans; and (3) permitted to act on its 
environment without immediate human supervision.”). 
 16 See Ying Hu, Robot Criminal Liability Revisited, in DANGEROUS IDEAS IN LAW 494, 
497-98 (Jin Soo Yoon, Sang Hoon Han & Seong Jo Ahn eds., 2018) (arguing that 
corporations are “structurally similar” to “robots that are equipped with machine 
learning algorithms to determine the appropriate course of actions in specific 
circumstances,” and concluding that “if there is reason to treat corporations as moral 
agents, there is reason to treat sophisticated robots as moral agents as well”); Hu, supra 
note 15, at 520-21 (“One may argue that a smart robot can act intentionally in the same 
way that a corporation can. A robot’s moral algorithms are functionally similar to a 
corporation’s internal decision structure . . . . By analogy, . . . any act made pursuant to 
a smart robot’s moral algorithms is an act done for the robot’s own reasons and would 
therefore amount to an intentional action.”). Unlike Hu, we do not argue that AIs have 
genuine moral responsibility. We focus on the legal notion of culpability, which 
involves institutional design constraints that allow it to diverge from moral 
responsibility or blameworthiness.  
 17 Alexander Sarch, Who Cares What You Think? Criminal Culpability and the 
Irrelevance of Unmanifested Mental States, 36 L. & PHIL. 707, 709 (2017) [hereinafter 
Who Cares]. 
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whose actions resemble those of other subjects of the criminal law, 
especially corporations. These harms may be irreducible where, for a 
variety of reasons, they are not directly attributable to the activity of a 
particular person or persons.18 Corporations similarly can directly face 
criminal charges when their defective procedures generate 
condemnable harms19 — particularly in scenarios where structural 
problems in corporate systems and processes are difficult to reduce to 
the wrongful actions of individuals.20  
It is necessary to do the difficult pragmatic work of thinking through 
the theoretical costs and benefits of AI punishment, how it could be 
implemented into criminal law doctrine, and to consider the 
alternatives. Our primary focus is not what form AI punishment would 
take, which could directly target AIs through censure, deactivation, or 
reprogramming, or could involve negative outcomes directed at natural 
persons or companies involved in the use or creation of AI.21 Rather, 
our focus is the prior question of whether the doctrinal and theoretical 
commitments of the criminal law can be reconciled with criminal 
liability for AI. 
Our inquiry focuses on the strongest case for punishing AI: scenarios 
where crimes are functionally committed by machines and there is no 
identifiable person who has acted with criminal culpability. We call 
these Hard AI Crimes. This can occur when no person has acted with 
criminal culpability, or when it is not practicably defensible to reduce 
an AI’s behavior to bad actors. There could be general deterrent and 
expressive benefits from imposing criminal liability on AI in such 
scenarios. Moreover, the most important negative, retributivist-style 
limitations that apply to persons need not prohibit AI punishment. On 
the other hand, there may be costs associated with AI punishment: 
conceptual confusion, expressive costs, spillover, and rights creep.22 In 
 
 18 See infra Part II.B.  
 19 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (outlining conditions under 
which a corporation could be convicted of an offense). 
 20 See William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 664-
68 (1994) (outlining prevalent models of “genuine corporate culpability” including 
proactive fault, reactive fault, corporate ethos, and corporate policy); infra notes 166–
168 and accompanying text (discussing ways to defend the irreducibility of corporate 
culpability). 
 21 See Hu, supra note 15, at 529-30 (discussing the question of how a robot should 
be punished, and proposing “a range of measures [that] might be taken to ensure that 
the robot commits fewer offenses in the future”); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, 
Remedies for Robots 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1316, 1389-93 (2019) (discussing the 
“robot death penalty”).  
 22 See infra Part III.  
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the end, our conclusion is this: While a coherent theoretical case can be 
made for punishing AI, it is not ultimately justified in light of the less 
disruptive alternatives that can provide substantially the same benefits. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief background 
of AI and “AI crime.” It then provides a framework for justifying 
punishment that considers affirmative benefits, negative limitations, 
and feasible alternatives. Part II considers potential benefits to AI 
punishment, and argues it could provide general deterrence and 
expressive benefits. Part III examines whether punishment of AI would 
violate any of the negative limitations on punishment that relate to 
desert, fairness, and the capacity for culpability. It finds that the most 
important constraints on punishment, such as requiring a capacity for 
culpability for it to be appropriately imposed, would not be violated by 
AI punishment.  
Finally, Part IV considers feasible alternatives to AI punishment. It 
argues the status quo is or will be inadequate for properly addressing AI 
crime. While direct AI punishment is a solution, this would require 
problematic changes to criminal law. Alternately, AI crime could be 
addressed through modest changes to criminal laws applied to 
individuals together with potentially expanded civil liability. We argue 
that civil liability is generally preferable to criminal liability for AI 
activity as it is proportionate to the scope of the current problem and a 
less significant departure from existing practice with fewer costs. In this 
way, the Article aims to map out the possible responses to the problem 
of harmful AI activity and makes the case for approaching AI 
punishment with extreme caution.  
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND PUNISHMENT 
A. Introduction to Artificial Intelligence  
We use the term “AI” to refer to a machine that is capable of 
completing tasks otherwise typically requiring human cognition.23 AI 
only sometimes has the ability to directly act physically, as in the case 
of a “robot,” but it is not necessary for an AI to directly affect physical 
activity to cause harm (as the RDS case demonstrates).  
 
 23 AI lacks a standard definition, but its very first definition in 1955 holds up 
reasonably well: “[T]he artificial intelligence problem is taken to be that of making a 
machine behave in ways that would be called intelligent if a human were so behaving.” J. 
MCCARTHY ET AL., A PROPOSAL FOR THE DARTMOUTH SUMMER RESEARCH PROJECT ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1955), http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/ 
dartmouth.html. 
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AI is rapidly improving, driven by advances in software, computing 
power, and big data.24 Hardly a day goes by without a new report of 
some impressive feat achieved by AI. In 2017, Alphabet’s flagship 
DeepMind AI beat the world champion of the board game Go.25 This 
was considered an important feat in the AI community, because of the 
sheer complexity of the game.26 There are more possible Go board 
configurations than there are atoms in the universe.27 Thus, a machine 
designed to play Go cannot simply be preprogrammed with optimal 
predetermined moves, or solely rely on a brute force approach to 
considering a large number of future moves.28 Go was the last 
traditional board game in which people had been able to outperform 
machines.29 
In some areas, AI already makes significant practical contributions. 
For instance, Google Translate supports more than 100 languages, 
including 37 by photo input, 32 by voice input, and 27 in “augmented 
reality mode.”30 The increasing prevalence and capability of AI will lead 
to widespread social benefit, but will also cause harm. Virtually all 
activity involves a risk of harm, and as AI comes to do more it will 
inevitably cause more harm.31  
A few features of AI are important to highlight. First, AI has the 
potential to act unpredictably.32 Some leading AIs rely on machine 
learning or similar technologies which involve a computer program, 
initially created by individuals, further developing in response to data 
without explicit programming.33 This is one means by which AI can 
 
 24 See Ryan Abbott, Everything Is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2, 23-28 (2019). 
 25 See id. at 24. 
 26 See id. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. 
 30 GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://translate.google.com/intl/en/about/languages/ (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
 31 See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, 
Where Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/ 
technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html. 
 32 See, e.g., Taha Yasseri, Never Mind Killer Robots — Even the Good Ones Are Scarily 
Unpredictable, PHYS.ORG (Aug. 25, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-08-mind-killer-
robots-good-scarily.html; Why Did the Neural Network Cross the Road?, AI WEIRDNESS 
(2018), http://aiweirdness.com/post/174691534037/why-did-the-neural-network-cross-
the-road (describing a programmer who made her machine learning algorithm attempt to 
tell jokes).  
 33 See, e.g., Davide Castelvecchi, Can We Open the Black Box of AI?, NATURE (Oct. 5, 
2016), https://www.nature.com/news/can-we-open-the-black-box-of-ai-1.20731. 
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engage in activities its original programmers may not have intended or 
foreseen.34  
Second, AI has the potential to act unexplainably. It may be possible 
to determine what an AI has done, but not how or why it acted as it 
did.35 This has led to some AIs being described as “black box” systems.36 
For instance, an algorithm may refuse a credit application but not be 
able to articulate why the application was rejected.37 That is particularly 
likely in the case of AIs that learn from data, and which may have been 
exposed to millions or billions of data points.38 Even if it is theoretically 
possible to explain an AI outcome, it may be impracticable given the 
potentially resource intensive nature of such inquiries, and the need to 
maintain earlier iterative versions of AI and specific data. 
Third, AI may act autonomously. For our purposes, that is to say an 
AI may cause harm without being directly controlled by an individual. 
Suppose an individual creates an AI to steal financial information by 
mimicking a bank’s website, stealing user information, and posting that 
information online. While the theft may be entirely reducible to an 
individual who is using the AI as a tool, the AI may continue to act in 
harmful ways without further human involvement. It may even be the 
case that the individual who sets an AI in motion is not able to regain 
control of the AI, which could be by design.39 
Fourth, while AI can already outperform people in spectacular 
fashion in some domains, like playing board games, in other domains 
AI is not even competitive with toddlers.40 That is because all AI is 
 
 34 There has been a recent focus on biased decisions by machine learning algorithms 
— sometimes due to a programmer’s implicit bias, sometimes due to biased training 
data. See, e.g., Chris DeBrusk, The Risk of Machine-Learning Bias (and How to Prevent It), 
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-risk-of-
machine-learning-bias-and-how-to-prevent-it/. 
 35 See, e.g., Castelvecchi, supra note 33.  
 36 Id.  
 37 See id. 
 38 See id.  
 39 “The DAO” was the most famous attempt to create a decentralized autonomous 
organization. See Samuel Falkon, The Story of the DAO—Its History and Consequences, 
THE STARTUP (Dec. 24, 2017), https://medium.com/swlh/the-story-of-the-dao-its-
history-and-consequences-71e6a8a551ee. The concept was to deploy an entity that 
could no longer be controlled by its creators and would act without further direction. 
The DAO would operate through smart contracts, or pre-programmed rules dictating 
future behavior. A DAO might be used to create an entity operating according to 
publicly available, unalterable code on a distributed ledger to prevent corporate 
mismanagement. Unfortunately, the DAO failed shortly after launch on Ethereum due 
to programming flaws and hacker interference. See id. 
 40 See Abbott, supra note 24, at 40. 
ABBOTT SARCH MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019 2:24 PM 
110 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:nnn 
designed to perform “narrow” or “specific” tasks.41 DeepMind can beat 
the world’s best human player at Go, but it could not translate English 
to French without being programmed to do so.42 By contrast, the holy 
grail of computer science research is developing “general” AI that would 
be able to perform any task that a person could perform.43 Experts are 
divided on whether, and when, general AI will be developed. For now, 
the weight of expert opinion holds there will likely be no general AI for 
at least a couple of decades.44  
Of course, it is possible for a conventional machine to perform 
unpredictably, unexplainably, or autonomously. However, at a 
minimum, AI is far more likely to exhibit these characteristics, and to 
exhibit them to a greater extent. Even a sufficient difference in degree 
along several axes makes AI worth considering as a distinctive 
phenomenon, possibly meriting novel legal responses. 
Finally, general AI, and even super- or ultra-intelligent AI,45 is 
different than the sort of self-aware, conscious, sentient AIs that are 
common in science fiction. The latter sorts of AIs, sometimes referred 
to as “strong AI,” are portrayed as having a human-like abilities to 
cognitively reason and to be morally culpable for their actions.46 Today, 
even the prospect of such machines is safely within the realm of science 
fiction.47 We will not consider punishment of strong AI.48  
B. A Framework for Understanding AI Crime  
We use the term “AI crime” as a loose shorthand for cases in which 
an AI would be criminally liable if a natural person had performed a 
similar act. Machines have caused harm since ancient times, and robots 
have caused fatalities since at least the 1970s.49 However, besides 
 
 41 Id. at 25. 
 42 See id. at 24-25. 
 43 Id. at 25. 
 44 See generally Vincent C. Müller & Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial 
Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 555 (Vincent C. Müller ed., 2016) (describing a survey finding that 
experts think AI superintelligence will not be a reality for at least a few decades). 
 45 See Abbott, supra note 24, at 23-28 (describing super- and ultra-intelligent AI). 
 46 See Jesus Rodriguez, Gödel, Consciousness and the Weak vs. Strong AI Debate, 
TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Aug. 23, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/g%C3%B6del-
consciousness-and-the-weak-vs-strong-ai-debate-51e71a9189ca. 
 47 See id. 
 48 If and when such machines come into existence, we will certainly enjoy reading 
their works on AI criminal liability. 
 49 See Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort 
Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2018) [hereinafter The Reasonable Computer]; 
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machines being intentionally used to inflict harm (as when a person 
runs someone over with their car), most harms caused by machines are 
seen as mere accidents. The exception is when the culpable carelessness 
of people using a machine caused the harm (as when negligence in 
using drilling machinery caused the BP oil spill).50 Such harms are not 
mere accidents; rather, they are accidents that implicate criminal law.51 
Nonetheless, even in such cases, criminal law is not usually deployed 
against the harmful machines themselves (at least outside of some 
intriguing but archaic prosecutions of inanimate objects).52 It may be 
that AI crimes are no different than any other harm for which a machine 
is involved.  
Yet AI can differ from conventional machines in a few essential ways 
that make the direct application of criminal law more worthy of 
consideration. Specifically, AI can behave in ways that display high 
degrees of autonomy and irreducibility.53 In terms of autonomy, AI is 
capable of acting largely independently of human control. AI can receive 
sensory input, set targets, assess outcomes against criteria, make 
decisions and adjust behavior to increase its likelihood of success — all 
without being directed by human orders.54 Reducibility is also critical 
 
Bryan Young, The First ‘Killer Robot’ Was Around Back in 1979, HOW STUFF WORKS (Apr. 
9, 2018), https://science.howstuffworks.com/first-killer-robot-was-around-back-in-
1979.htm. 
 50 See Clifford Krauss & John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/global/ 
16iht-bp16.html. 
 51 See BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, 
Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident, 
U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bp-exploration-and-
production-inc-agrees-plead-guilty-felony-manslaughter-environmental (outlining BP’s 
guilty plea to criminal offenses). 
 52 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *302; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW 7, 24 (1881) (during Edward I’s reign “[i]f a man fell from a tree, the tree 
was deodand” — forfeited as an “accursed thing” and given to God); Albert W. 
Alschuler, Comment, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge 
and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307, 312 (1991) (“Just as primitive people hated and 
punished the wheel of a cart that had run someone over . . . some of us truly manage to 
hate the corporate entity.”). 
 53 We will not attempt to articulate the non-functional differences between human 
and algorithmic reasoning, a subject which has fascinated and confounded computer 
scientists since the 1950s. See, e.g., A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 
59 MIND 433 (1950). Functionally, AI and people can exhibit similar patterns of 
behavior and information processing, regardless of whether machines “think” or 
understand what they do. See David J. Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of 
Consciousness, 2 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 200, 216 (1995) (distinguishing intellectual 
capacities from phenomenal consciousness). 
 54 See supra notes 24–37 and accompanying text. 
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because if an AI engages in an act that would be criminal for a person 
and the act is reducible, then there typically will be a person that could 
be criminally liable.55 If an AI act is not effectively reducible, there may 
be no other party that is aptly punished, in which case intuitively 
criminal activity could occur without the possibility of punishment.  
Almost all AI crimes are likely to be reducible. For instance, if an 
individual develops an AI to hack into a self-driving car to disable vital 
safety features, that individual has directly committed a crime.56 If 
someone strikes another person with a rock, the rock has not committed 
battery — the individual throwing the rock has. Even where AI behaves 
autonomously, to the extent that a person uses AI as a tool to commit a 
crime, and the AI functions foreseeably, the crime involves an 
identifiable defendant causing the harm. Even when AI causes 
unforeseeable harm, it may still be reducible — for example, if an 
individual creates an AI to steal financial information, but a 
programming error results in the AI shutting down an electrical grid 
that disrupts hospital care. This is a familiar problem in criminal law.57 
If someone commits a robbery and in so doing injures bystanders in 
unforeseeable ways (imagine a tripped bank alarm startles the animals 
in a neighboring zoo and they break loose and trample pedestrians), 
criminal law has doctrinal tools by which liability could still be 
imposed.58  
Sometimes, however, it may be difficult to reduce AI crime to an 
individual due to AI autonomy, complexity, or lack of explainability. A 
large number of individuals may contribute to development of an AI 
over a long period of time. For instance, with some open source 
software, thousands of people can collaborate informally to create an 
AI.59 In the case of AI that develops in response to training with data, it 
may be difficult to attribute responsibility for an AI output where the 
 
 55 See infra Part IV.A. 
 56 See Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of 
Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 393, 433 (2015) 
(discussing crimes applicable to this scenario).  
 57 See infra Part IV. 
 58 See infra Part IV.A (discussing constructive liability offenses).  
 59 In 2017, for instance, more than 4,500 Microsoft employees contributed to open 
source software hosted on GitHub. See Matt Asay, Who Really Contributes to Open 
Source, INFOWORLD (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.infoworld.com/article/3253948/open-
source-tools/who-really-contributes-to-open-source.html#tk.twt_ifw. GitHub is a 
development platform that hosts open source code. See Frederic Lardinois & Ingrid 
Lunden, Microsoft Has Acquired GitHub for $7.5B in Stock, TECHCRUNCH (June 4, 2018, 
6:08 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/04/microsoft-has-acquired-github-for-7-5b-
in-microsoft-stock/. 
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machine has learned how to behave based on accessing millions or 
billions of data points from heterogeneous sources.60 Thus, it may be 
more difficult to assign fault to individuals where AI is concerned versus 
a conventional product such as a car, where just one component is 
faulty. In fact, it may be practically impossible to reduce an AI generated 
harm to the actions of individuals. 
Even where AI developers are known, an AI might end up causing 
harm without any unreasonable human behavior. Suppose two 
experienced and expert programmers separately contribute code for the 
software of an autonomous vehicle, but the two contributions 
unforeseeably interact in ways that cause the vehicle to deliberately 
collide with individuals wearing striped shirts. If this was the result of 
some not-reasonably-foreseeable interactions between the two 
programmers’ contributions, then presumably neither programmer 
would have criminal liability. Generally, to be criminally liable, an 
individual has to intend a certain prohibited socially undesirable 
outcome — or at least act recklessly, which is acting despite being aware 
of a substantial and unjustified risk that one’s conduct may produce a 
prohibited outcome.61 Sometimes, although more controversially,62 
criminal liability can be imposed on a negligence basis when one causes 
harm that a reasonable person would have foreseen and taken 
precautions to avoid.63 At least in a case where AI activity has, from the 
perspective of a reasonable person, unforeseeably caused harm, 
individuals would not generally face criminal liability, as this would not 
even meet the threshold for criminal negligence. In some cases, they 
would not even be civilly liable if their actions were not negligent under 
the tort standard.64  
There are several possible grounds on which criminal law might deem 
AI crime to be irreducible.65  
 
 60 See Lothar Determann & Bruce Perens, Open Cars, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 915, 
988 (2017). 
 61 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)-(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (defining purpose 
and recklessness). 
 62 See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 70 (2009) (arguing there should be no criminal liability for 
negligence).  
 63 See § 2.02(2)(d) (defining negligence).  
 64 Developers may be civilly liable other than under tortious negligence. For 
instance, if it were a defective commercial “product,” its supplier might be subject to 
strict product liability. Abbott, The Reasonable Computer, supra note 49, at 13-16 
(discussing product liability law). However, such liability only applies in limited 
situations. See id. 
 65 See infra Part III.B.1. 
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1) Enforcement Problems: A bad actor is responsible for an AI 
crime, but the individual cannot be identified by law 
enforcement. For example, this might be the case where the 
creator of a computer virus has managed to remain 
anonymous.66 
2) Practical Irreducibility: It would be impractical for legal 
institutions to seek to reduce the harmful AI conduct to 
individual human actions, because of the number of people 
involved, the difficulty in determining how they contributed to 
the AI’s design, or because they were active far away or long ago. 
Criminal law inquiries do not extend indefinitely for a variety 
of sound reasons.67  
3) Legal Irreducibility: Even if the law could reduce the AI crime 
to a set of individual human actions, it may be bad criminal law 
policy to do so. For example, unjustified risks might not be 
substantial enough to warrant being criminalized. Perhaps 
multiple individuals acted carelessly in insubstantial ways, but 
their acts synergistically led to AI causing significant harm. In 
such cases, the law might deem the AI’s conduct to be 
irreducible for reasons of criminalization policy.  
We will largely set aside enforcement-based reasons for irreducibility 
as less interesting from a legal design perspective. Enforcement 
problems exist without AI. Other forms of irreducibility may exist, such 
as moral irreducibility, but we will not focus on these here because they 
are controversial and undertheorized.68 
Instead, our analysis will focus on what we take to be less controversial 
forms of irreducibility: those where it is not practically feasible to reduce 
the harmful AI conduct to human actors, or where the harmful AI 
 
 66 The chance of being prosecuted for a cyberattack in the United States is estimated 
at a mere 0.05% versus 46% for a violent crime. See William Dixon, Fighting Cybercrime 
— What Happens to the Law When the Law Cannot Be Enforced?, WORLD ECON. FORUM 
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/fighting-cybercrime-what-
happens-to-the-law-when-the-law-cannot-be-enforced/. Incidentally, cybercrime is 
predicted to cost the global economy $6 trillion by 2021. See id. 
 67 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the reducibility challenge as applied to corporate 
liability).  
 68 It’s conceivable the law might adopt a “moral irreducibility” view. That is, the 
law might deem an AI (perhaps incorrectly) to be a full-blown moral agent (i.e., 
genuinely responsible for its conduct) and for that reason the law might regard its 
conduct as irreducible. However, while this might be logically possible, we have doubts 
about it — especially if sufficient creativity is used to identify bad human behavior 
nearby. See generally infra Part III.B.1. 
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conduct was just the result of human misconduct too trivial to penalize. 
In these instances, AI can be seen as autonomously committing crimes 
in irreducible ways, where there is no responsible person. This is what 
we refer to as “Hard AI Crime” and what we take to provide the strongest 
case for holding AI criminally liable in its own right.  
C. A Mainstream Theory of Punishment 
To anchor our analysis, this section introduces a theory of 
punishment that reflects the broad consensus in the literature.69 We use 
the term “punishment” roughly as defined by H.L.A. Hart in terms of 
five elements: 
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant; 
(ii) It must be for an offense against legal rules; 
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his 
offense; 
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings 
other than the offender; and 
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority 
constituted by a legal system against which the offense is 
committed.70 
Thus, “punishment” requires a conviction for a legally recognized 
offense following accepted procedures.71 Under this definition, 
imprisonment, fines, or asset forfeiture carried out in response to a 
proper conviction for a specified offense would count as punishment, 
but a range of other activities that most people might consider 
“punishment” in a loose sense would not.72 For instance, harsh 
 
 69 See generally Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 141, 144-45 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) 
(noting the convergence on this sort of theory of punishment). 
 70 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
4-5 (2d ed. 2008).  
 71 This is likewise supported by the principle of legality, built into any well-
functioning legal system. This principle (nulla poena sin lege) provides that it is not 
legally permitted to penalize someone for an action without a law prohibiting that 
conduct. See Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and 
the “Equal Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of 
Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 30 (1994). 
 72 See HART, supra note 70, at 5. 
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treatment by private citizens for violating informal social norms, 
preventative detention of people suffering from mental illnesses on 
grounds of their being a danger to themselves or others, or asset 
forfeiture carried out in advance of a conviction would not count as 
punishment.73 Civil penalties, while violations of legal norms, do not 
count as an “offense” for criminal law purposes, as criminal law seeks 
to condemn egregious categories of conduct.74  
Punishment is justified only if its affirmative justifications outweigh 
its costs and it does not otherwise offend applicable negative limitations 
on punishment. Affirmative justifications are the positive benefits that 
punishment might produce like harm reduction, increased safety, 
enhanced well-being, or expressing a commitment to core moral or 
political values. Such benefits can give reason to criminalize certain 
types of conduct and impose sanctions on actors who perform those 
types of acts. Affirmative justifications are distinct from negative 
limitations on punishment, which are commonly associated with 
culpability-focused retributivist views of criminal law. For example, it 
is widely held to be unjust to punish the innocent — or to punish 
wrongdoers in excess of what they deserve in virtue of their culpability 
— even if this would promote aggregate well-being in society.75 This so-
called “desert constraint” imposes a limitation, grounded in justice, on 
promoting social welfare through punishment.76 
1. Affirmative Reasons to Punish 
It is common to be a pluralist about the benefits of punishment.77 U.S. 
federal law refers to the most widely acknowledged benefits, including 
 
 73 It remains open, on this definition, whether mere arrest is itself a form of 
punishment. It is properly carried out only in response to a suspected criminal offense, 
although it is in advance of a conviction and therefore it is unclear whether it satisfies 
the “imposed for an offense” requirement in (i). As Hart notes, these may be 
punishment-like in some respects, but do not fall within the core concept of 
punishment. See id.  
 74 To deem some conduct an offense is to condemn it, to mark it out as culpable 
and to label the one who commits it an offender. See R A DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 19-20 (2018) [hereinafter REALM]. The expression of condemnation and declaring 
someone convicted of a crime to be an offender who is guilty is a feature of core 
punishment, but not civil liability. Because Hart’s definition is couched in terms like 
“offense” and “offender,” carrying as they do connotations of culpability and 
condemnation, civil liability would not qualify as punishment.  
 75 See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.  
 76 See id. 
 77 See Berman, supra note 69, at 141-42 (noting the “converg[ence] on a desert-
constrained pluralism” about the justifications of punishment, describing it as 
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the need to “afford deterrence to criminal conduct,” to “protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant,” to “provide the defendant 
with” rehabilitative treatment of various kinds, as well as to reflect “the 
seriousness of the offense” which covers the culpability of the act and 
the desert of the actor.78 
For simplicity, the affirmative aims of punishment can be grouped 
into two main categories: (a) consequentialist aims and (b) retributivist 
aims. Some theorists also mention (c) expressive aims, though these are 
largely reducible to the aims in the first two categories.79 
Consequentialist benefits cover the good consequences that 
punishment can bring about, usually understood as enhancing the 
aggregate well-being of the members of society by reducing harm. The 
main type of consequentialist benefit of punishment is preventive, in 
that punishment can reduce crime.  
Punishment can reduce crime several ways. The simplest is 
incapacitation: when the offender is locked up, he or she is physically 
limited from committing further crimes while incarcerated.80 The next 
and arguably most important way punishment prevents harm is through 
deterrence — namely by threatening negative consequences for the 
commission of a crime that give would-be offenders reasons to refrain 
from prohibited conduct.81 Deterrence comes in two forms: (i) specific 
deterrence and (ii) general deterrence. Specific deterrence is the process 
whereby punishing a specific individual discourages that person from 
committing more crime in the future.82 General deterrence occurs when 
punishing an offender discourages other would-be offenders from 
committing crimes.83 It is a matter of punishing an offender in order to 
“send a message” to other potential offenders. There can be affirmative 
 
“something approaching a consensus” view); Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, 
in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 25, 25 (Mark D. White ed., 2011) 
(“[M]any have proposed a hybrid model of ‘limiting retributivism’ that explicitly 
purports to combine aspects of both the canonical theories” of consequentialism and 
retributivism, suggesting that “the ascendant view of punishment is more openly 
pluralistic about its purposes . . . .”). 
 78 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2019). 
 79 See Berman, supra note 69, at 148 (discussing whether expressivism reduces to 
consequentialism).  
 80 See Consequentialist Accounts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 18, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/#PurConPun (“It is commonly 
suggested that punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitatiing [sic], 
or reforming potential offenders . . . .”). 
 81 See id.  
 82 See Berman, supra note 69, at 145 (discussing types of deterrence). 
 83 See id.  
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benefits to punishing those who qualify for an insanity defense because 
it may deter sane individuals from committing crimes and attempting 
to rely on an insanity defense.84 
These are not the only kinds of consequentialist benefits that can 
support punishment. Besides incapacitation and deterrence, 
punishment can reduce harm through rehabilitation of the offender.85 
Insofar as punishment helps the offender to see the error of his or her 
ways, or training or skills are provided during incarceration, this, too, 
can help prevent future crimes. 
Besides crime prevention, there also may be non-consequentialist 
benefits that can provide additional affirmative grounds for 
punishment. Most importantly, it may be intrinsically valuable to give 
culpable actors what they deserve in a way that does not just reduce to 
the value of harm reduction.86 In other words, the idea is that 
retribution, giving offenders what they are due in virtue of the 
culpability of what they did, is intrinsically valuable or fitting.87 
Retribution matters, for example, because it allows society to 
sufficiently distance itself from the offender’s wrongdoing and prevents 
it from being complicit (or overly tolerant) of culpable wrongdoing.88 
 
 84 Hart offered this response to Bentham’s argument that because children and the 
insane are not deterrable, they should not be punished. Hart argues more soberly that 
“though . . . the threat of punishment could not have operated on [children or the 
insane], the actual infliction of punishment on those persons, may secure a higher 
measure of conformity to law on the part of normal persons.” HART, supra note 70, at 
19. While there are other reasons for not punishing children and the insane (i.e., 
reduced culpability), Bentham’s “undeterrability” argument is not a convincing reason.  
 85 See Berman, supra note 69, at 145 (discussing rehabilitation). 
 86 To illustrate, suppose punishing a murderer will do absolutely nothing to prevent 
future crime or reduce harm to others. Maybe the offense was committed decades ago 
and the offender is now too infirm to reoffend. Suppose the punishment is guaranteed 
to remain a complete secret from the public. Punishment would thus not result in 
specific or general deterrence, but there may still be a retributive reason to punish. The 
reason would stem from the value (if any) inherent in giving offenders what they are 
due in virtue of their culpability.  
 87 See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 26 (2011) [ENDS OF HARM] (identifying retributivism with the claim that it is 
“intrinsically valuable” that offenders suffer in proportion to their desert); John 
Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1979); Doug Husak, 
Retributivism in Extremis, 32 L. & PHIL. 3, 4-5 (2013) (defending broader versions of 
retributivism). 
 88 See Leora Dahan Katz, Response Retributivism: Defending the Duty to Punish 16-17 
(Oct. 10, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3264139. 
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While virtually everyone agrees that the good consequences of 
preventing crime must be a major part of what justifies punishment,89 
there is more debate about whether retributivist reasons also exist.90 
While retributivist reasons for punishment are worth taking seriously, 
here we assume that the lion’s share of the affirmative case in favor of 
punishment will involve harm reduction and similar desirable 
consequences. 
One last group of affirmative reasons that merit mention are 
expressive reasons.91 Punishment involves the communication of 
society’s collective commitment to certain core values. The state, 
through punishment, conveys official condemnation of culpable 
conduct through the mechanism of a criminal conviction. Victims may 
benefit psychologically to see the state reaffirm their rights which were 
violated by a criminal act. Officially expressing condemnation of 
culpable conduct may also affect behavior and attitudes in general by 
reinforcing positive social values.92  
Some question whether expressive benefits are a distinct category of 
reason to punish, or whether they simply reduce to consequentialist or 
retributivist reasons.93 After all, many of the benefits in the expressive 
category center around harm prevention, such as the deterrent effects 
of signaling that society will not stand for seriously culpable conduct. 
Expressive reasons might also reduce to retributivist reasons insofar as 
the value of expressing condemnation is that it involves giving offenders 
their due. In what follows, we assume expressive benefits reduce to 
consequentialist or retributive reasons, but not much turns on it. Our 
arguments are also compatible with the contrary view. 
2. Negative (Retributive) Limitations 
Punishment also should not violate deeply held normative 
commitments such as justice or fairness. The most important of these 
limitations focus on the culpability of those subject to the criminal law. 
One such limitation on punishment is the desert constraint, which 
figures into most retributivist views.94 The desert constraint claims that 
 
 89 See TADROS, ENDS OF HARM, supra note 87, at 21. 
 90 See, e.g., id. at 60. 
 91 See R A DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 140-46 (2007) [hereinafter ANSWERING]. 
 92 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 161-62 
(2013). 
 93 E.g., Berman, supra note 69, at 148. 
 94 See id. at 144 (on retributivism, punishment is justified if, but only to the extent 
that, “it is deserved or otherwise fitting, right or appropriate, and not [necessarily 
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an offender may not, in justice, be punished in excess of his or her 
desert. Desert, in turn, is understood mainly in terms of the culpability 
one incurs in virtue of one’s conduct. The main effect of the desert 
constraint is to rule out punishments that go beyond what is 
proportionate to one’s culpability.95 Thus, it would be wrong to execute 
someone for jaywalking even if doing so would ultimately save lives by 
reducing illegal and dangerous pedestrian crossings.  
What supports the desert constraint? Intuition, for one thing. It seems 
unjust to punish someone who is completely innocent even if it would 
produce significant benefits through general deterrence.96 Similarly, it 
seems unjust to impose a very severe punishment on someone who only 
committed a minor crime. Beyond its intuitive plausibility, the desert 
constraint is also supported by the argument — tracing back at least to 
Kant — that it is wrong to use people merely as a means to one’s ends 
without also treating them as ends in themselves (i.e., without 
respecting their value as persons).97 The idea is that punishing the 
innocent to obtain broader social benefits is a paradigmatic example of 
treating people merely as means, which fails to show individuals the 
respect they are due. Under some Kantian views, the desert constraint 
is absolute: It is not appropriate to treat someone merely as a means to 
one’s ends regardless of the costs of respecting their value as persons. 
Others have a more nuanced view, such that violating a negative 
limitation could be overall justified if the benefits were sufficiently 
weighty.98  
There are limitations on punishment other than the desert constraint. 
Most importantly, criminal law requires certain prerequisites, such as a 
capacity for culpability, that defendants must meet in order to be 
properly subject to punishment. It is a fundamental aim of criminal law 
to condemn culpable wrongdoing, and it is the default position in 
criminal law doctrine that punishment may only be properly imposed 
 
because of] any good consequences” it may have); see also id. at 151 (discussing desert-
constrained consequentialism). 
 95 Negative retributivism is the view that the desert of the offender only prohibits 
punishing in excess of desert (even if it has good consequences). Positive retributivism 
says that the offender’s desert provides an affirmative reason for punishment.  
 96 Cf. HART, supra note 70, at 12 (discussing the famous example of the small 
southern town). 
 97 See, e.g., TADROS, ENDS OF HARM, supra note 87, at 114 (defending a version of the 
means principle).  
 98 See, e.g., HART, supra note 70, at 12 (“In extreme cases many might think it right 
to resort to these expedients but we should do so with the sense of sacrificing an 
important principle.”). 
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in response to culpable wrongdoing.99 Without the requisite capacities 
of deliberation and agency, an entity is not an appropriate subject for 
criminal punishment — as can be seen from the fact that lacking such 
capacities altogether can give rise to an incapacity defense.100 Thus, 
capacity for culpability is an eligibility requirement for being aptly 
subject to regulation by criminal law.  
3. Alternatives to Punishment 
For punishment to be justified, it is not enough for it to have 
affirmative benefits and to be consistent with the negative limitations 
for punishment. In addition, there cannot be better, feasible 
alternatives, including doing nothing. This is an obvious point that is 
built into policy analysis of all kinds.101  
Even if punishing AI has affirmative benefits, and even if the practice 
did not seriously violate any negative limitations, it still would not be 
justified if, for example, civil liability, licensure, or industry standards 
provide a better solution. It is often claimed that when seeking to exert 
social control, criminal law should be a tool of last resort.102 After all, 
criminal law sanctions are the harshest form of penalty society has 
available, involving as they do both the possible revocation of personal 
freedom as well as the official condemnation of the offender. Thus, the 
third requirement for a given punishment to be justified is the absence 
of better alternatives.  
 
 99 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (declaring that one of the 
“general purposes” of the Code is “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from 
condemnation as criminal”); Nicola Lacey & Hanna Pickard, To Blame or to Forgive? 
Reconciling Punishment and Forgiveness in Criminal Justice, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
665, 666 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqv012 (observing that on retributivist 
theories, “punishment is only justified if the condition of responsible agency is met”); 
DUFF, REALM, supra note 74, at 19-20 (noting that “censure . . . is essential to a criminal 
conviction” and that a legal system “that criminalizes conduct that is not even alleged 
to be or portrayed as being wrongful is, necessarily, a perversion of criminal law”). 
 100 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (outlining the incapacity defense based on mental 
defect as when a person is unable “either to appreciate the criminality . . . of his conduct 
or to conform [it to] the law”). 
 101 See Sven Ove Hansson, Philosophical Problems in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 ECON. 
& PHIL. 163, 164 (2007) (“In cost-benefit analysis, an alternative is not evaluated by 
itself but in comparison to other alternatives (or, at least, in comparison to not choosing 
that alternative).”). 
 102 E.g., Doug Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 
235 (2004) (discussing the view that “[a]mong those modes of social control we are 
likely to deem acceptable, the criminal law should be used only as a last resort”). 
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4. Putting the Pieces Together 
Determining whether a given punishment is appropriate requires 
investigation of three questions:  
a) Affirmative Benefits: Are there sufficiently strong affirmative 
reasons in favor of punishment? This chiefly concerns 
consequentialist benefits of harm reduction but may also 
include retributive and expressive benefits. 
b) Negative Limitations: Would punishment be consistent with 
applicable negative limitations? This primarily concerns 
culpability-focused principles like the desert constraint as well 
as basic prerequisites of apt criminal punishment such as 
capacity for culpability.  
c) Feasible Alternatives: Is punishment a better response to the 
harms or wrongs in question, compared to alternatives like civil 
liability, regulation, or doing nothing? 
In the remainder of this Article, we will apply this theory to 
investigate whether the direct punishment of AI is justified. We will 
begin in Part II with the question of Affirmative Benefits, consider 
Negative Limitations in Part III, then Feasible Alternatives in Part IV.  
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE 
This Part considers the affirmative benefits that might be adduced to 
support punishing AI. The discussion focuses primarily on 
consequentialist benefits. Even if retribution can also count in favor of 
punishment, we assume that such benefits would be less important than 
consequentialist considerations centering on harm reduction.103 This 
Part does not aim to completely canvass the benefits of punishing AI. 
Instead, it argues that punishing AI could produce at least some 
significant affirmative benefits. 
A. Consequentialist Benefits 
Recall that, arguably, the paramount aim of punishment is to reduce 
harmful criminal activity through deterrence. Thus, a preliminary 
objection to punishing AI is that it will not produce any affirmative 
harm-reduction benefits because AI is not deterrable. Peter Asaro argues 
that “deterrence only makes sense when moral agents are capable of 
 
 103 See TADROS, ENDS OF HARM, supra note 87, at 25-28. 
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recognizing the similarity of their potential choices and actions to those 
of other moral agents who have been punished for the wrong choices 
and actions — without this . . . recognition of similarity between and 
among moral agents, punishment cannot possibly result in 
deterrence.”104 The idea is that if AIs cannot detect and respond to 
criminal law sanctions in a way that renders them deterrable, there 
would be nothing to affirmatively support punishing AI. It is likely true 
that AI, as currently operated and envisioned, will not be responsive to 
punishment, although responsive AI is theoretically possible.105 
The answer to the undeterrability argument requires distinguishing 
specific deterrence from general deterrence.106 Specific deterrence 
involves incentivizing a particular defendant not to commit crimes in 
the future.107 By contrast, general deterrence involves incentivizing other 
actors besides the defendant from committing crimes. We must further 
distinguish two types of general deterrence: deterring others from 
committing offenses of the same type the defendant was convicted of, 
offense-relative general deterrence, and deterring others from committing 
crimes in general, unrestricted general deterrence. 
Punishing AI could provide general deterrence. Presumably, it will 
not produce offense-relative general deterrence to other AIs, as such 
systems are not designed to be sensitive to criminal law prohibitions 
and sanctions. Nonetheless, AI punishment could produce unrestricted 
general deterrence. That is to say, direct punishment of AI could 
provide unrestricted general deterrence as against the developers, 
owners, or users of AI and provide incentives for them to avoid creating 
AIs that cause especially egregious types of harm without excuse or 
justification. Depending on the penalty associated with punishment, 
such as destruction of an AI, what Mark Lemley and Brian Casey have 
 
 104 Peter M. Asaro, A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on 
Robotics, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 169, 181 
(Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012). Asaro is ultimately skeptical of punishing robots because of 
questions about how to make AI be directly responsive to punishments. See id. at 182.  
 105 It is conceivable that AIs could be programmed to follow court orders or adapt 
their behavior in response to a conviction. This may be a less effective way to ensure AI 
lawfulness, however, than programming the AI ex ante not to run afoul of criminal law. 
This will be more challenging with criminal laws that are standards rather than simple 
rules. It is comparatively easy to program a self-driving car not to run a red light 
compared to programming it not to run a red light except in unspecified emergency 
conditions. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557 (1992) (arguing that standards are more costly to interpret and apply). 
 106 See HART, supra note 70, at 19.  
 107 See Berman, supra note 69, at 145. 
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termed the “robot death penalty,”108 punishing AI directly could deprive 
such developers, owners or users of the financial benefits of the systems. 
This penalty may thereby incentivize such human parties to modify 
their behavior in socially desirable ways. The deterrence effect may be 
stronger if capitalization requirements are associated with some forms 
of AI in the future, or if penalties associated with punishment are passed 
on to, for example, an AI’s owner. 
B. Expressive Considerations 
Punishment of AI may also have expressive benefits.109 Expressing 
condemnation of the harms suffered by the victims of an AI could 
provide these victims with a sense of satisfaction and vindication. 
Christina Mulligan has defended the idea that punishing robots can 
generate victim-satisfaction benefits, arguing that, “taking revenge 
against wrongdoing robots, specifically, may be necessary to create 
psychological satisfaction in those whom robots harm.”110 On her view, 
“robot punishment — or more precisely, revenge against robots — 
primarily advances . . . the creation of psychological satisfaction in 
robots’ victims.”111 Punishment conveys a message of official 
condemnation that could reaffirm the interests, rights, and ultimately 
the value of the victims of the harmful AI.112 This, in turn, could 
produce an increased sense of security among victims and society in 
general. 
This sort of expressivist argument in favor of punishing AI may seem 
especially forceful in light of empirical work demonstrating the human 
tendency to anthropomorphize and attribute mentality to artificial 
 
 108 Lemley & Casey, supra note 21, at 100.  
 109 Analogous considerations could apply to provide support for punishing 
inanimate objects and corporations. 
 110 Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, 69 S.C. L. REV. 579, 580 (2018); cf. 
David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 
54 (1989) (discussing but rejecting the idea of defending puzzling features of criminal 
law on the ground that when harm results the population may demand blood). 
 111 Mulligan, supra note 110, at 593. 
 112 See DUFF, ANSWERING, supra note 91, at 114; Guyora Binder, Victims and the 
Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 713, 733 (2008) (“We punish not only in 
order to admonish the offender . . . but also . . . to show the victim our own respect. If 
so, we are punishing harm for a purpose that transcends doing justice to the offender.”); 
Jack Boeglin & Zachary Shapiro, A Theory of Differential Punishment, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
1499, 1503 (2017) (arguing that victims’ interests should be taken “into account when 
determining how severely criminal offenders should be punished”). 
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persons like corporations.113 The same sorts of tendencies are likely to 
be even more powerful for AI-enabled robots that are specifically 
designed to seem human enough to elicit emotional responses from 
humans.114 In the corporate context, some theorists argue that 
corporations should be punished because the law should reflect lay 
perceptions of praise and blame, “folk morality,” or else risk losing its 
perceived legitimacy.115 This sort of argument, if it succeeds for 
corporate punishment, is likely to be even more forceful as applied to 
punishing AI, which often are deliberately designed to piggy-back on 
the innate tendency to anthropomorphize.116 Were the law to fail to 
express condemnation of robot-generated harms despite robots being 
widely perceived as blameworthy (even if this is ultimately a mistaken 
perception), this could erode the perception of the legitimacy of 
criminal law. Thus, a number of benefits could be obtained through the 
expressive function of punishment.117  
Nonetheless, there are a range of prima facie worries about appealing 
to expressive benefits like victim satisfaction in order to justify the 
 
 113 See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2049, 2078 (2016) (arguing that “[w]hen groups exhibit high levels of coherence, as do 
most corporations, humans perceive them as possessing many of the attributes 
traditionally associated with individuals,” thus rendering “‘blame and punishment [of] 
these groups . . . psychologically sensible and sustainable’”); id. at 2077-79 (collecting 
psychology sources). 
 114 See Matthias Scheutz, The Inherent Dangers of Unidirectional Emotional Bonds 
Between Humans and Social Robots, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 205, 205-22 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012); Sherry Turkle, In 
Good Company? On the Threshold of Robotic Companions, in CLOSE ENGAGEMENTS WITH 
ARTIFICIAL COMPANIONS 3, 3 (Yorick Wilks ed., 2010); Luisa Damiano & Paul 
Dumouchel, Anthropomorphism in Human-Robot Co-evolution, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00468 (discussing “social robotics” 
which sees anthropomorphism not as “a cognitive error” but as a useful tool “to 
facilitate social interactions between humans and . . . social robots”); see Ryan Calo, 
Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 538 (2015). 
 115 See Diamantis, supra note 113, at 2088-89 (“[A] criminal legal system that is more 
responsive to society’s perceptions of blameworthiness may foster forces, like respect 
for and confidence in the law, that ultimately increase compliance by individuals. 
Conversely, ignoring lay perceptions of blameworthiness . . . threatens to undermine 
the broader effectiveness of the criminal law in preventing crime.”). See generally 
ROBINSON, supra note 92, at 176-88 (discussing lay observers’ ideas as they bear on the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system). 
 116 See, e.g., Margaret Rhodes, The Touchy Task of Making Robots Seem Human — But 
Not Too Human, WIRED (Jan. 19, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/ 
touchy-task-making-robots-seem-human-not-human/.  
 117 Some might worry that expressive benefits just are consequentialist reasons to 
punish AI. While conceptually interesting, not much of practical importance turns on 
this issue for our purposes. 
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punishment of AI. First, punishing AI to placate those who want 
retaliation for AI-generated harms would be akin to giving in to mob 
justice. Legitimizing such reactions could enable populist calls for 
justice to be pressed more forcefully in the future. The mere fact that 
punishing AI might be popular would not show the practice to be just. 
As David Lewis observed, if it is unjust for the population to “demand 
blood” in response to seeing harm, then satisfying such demands 
through the law would itself be unjust — even if “it might be prudent 
to ignore justice and do their bidding.”118 Simply put, the popularity of 
a practice does not automatically justify it, even if popularity could be 
relevant to its normative justification. Second, punishing AI for 
expressivist purposes could lead to further bad behavior that might spill 
over to the way other humans are treated.119 Thus, Kate Darling has 
argued robots should be protected from cruelty in order to reflect moral 
norms and prevent undesirable human behavior.120 
Third, expressing certain messages through punishment may also 
carry affirmative costs which should not be omitted from the calculus. 
Punishing AI could send the message that AI is itself an actor on par 
with a human being, which is responsible and can be held accountable 
through the criminal justice system. Such a message is concerning, as it 
could entrench the view that AI has rights to certain kinds of benefits, 
protections and dignities that could restrict valuable human activities.  
In sum, punishing AI may have affirmative benefits. It could result in 
general deterrence for developers, owners, and users, as well as produce 
expressive benefits (if also potential costs). Whether these benefits 
would provide sufficient justification for punishing AI when compared 
to the feasible alternatives will be discussed in Part IV. Before that, we 
turn to another kind of threshold question: whether punishing AI 
violates the culpability-focused negative limitations on punishment.  
 
 118 Lewis, supra note 110, at 54. 
 119 This is similar to Kant’s point that although he thought animals are not strictly 
speaking moral persons, there are still good reasons to discourage the mistreatment of 
animals because it could embolden people to mistreat other human beings. See The 
Moral Status of Animals, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 23, 2017) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ (discussing Kant’s view of ethical 
treatment of animals: if one unfairly harms a dog “he does not fail in his duty to the dog 
. . . but . . . [he] must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals 
becomes hard also in his dealings with men” (quoting Kant’s Lectures on Ethics)). 
 120 See Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of 
Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT 
LAW 213, 228 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016). Relatedly, in 
the United Kingdom, laws criminalizing animal cruelty exist to disapprove of offensive 
human conduct. See Animal Welfare Act 2006, c. 45 (Gr. Brit.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/45/contents. 
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III. RETRIBUTIVE AND CONCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS 
This Part considers retributivist (culpability-focused) limitations on 
punishment. Section A asks whether AI is the right kind of entity to be 
eligible for punishment — what we call The Eligibility Challenge. Where 
criminal law’s fundamental prerequisites are not satisfied, its sanctions 
are not legitimately deployed. Section B considers two further 
retributivist objections to the punishment of AI. The Reductionist 
Challenge insists that any apparent AI culpability is fully reducible to the 
actions of persons who are better targets for punishment. This challenge 
purports to show that there is no need for the direct punishment of AI. 
Finally, the Spillover Objection insists it would be unjust to punish AI if 
this would predictably harm innocent people who develop, own, or use 
such systems. Finally, Section C considers the conceptual objection that 
AI punishment is not actually punishment at all. 
A. The Eligibility Challenge 
The Eligibility Challenge is simple to state: AI, like inanimate objects, 
is not the right kind of thing to be punished. AI lacks mental states and 
the deliberative capacities needed for culpability, so it cannot be 
punished without sacrificing the core commitments of the criminal law. 
The issue is not that AI punishment would be unfair to AI. AIs are not 
conscious and do not feel (at least in the phenomenal sense),121 and they 
do not possess interests or well-being.122 Therefore, there is no reason 
to think AI gets the benefit of the protections of the desert constraint, 
which prohibits punishment in excess of what culpability merits.123 The 
Eligibility Challenge does not derive from the desert constraint.  
Instead, the Eligibility Challenge, properly construed, comes in one 
narrow and one broad form. The narrow version is that, as a mere 
machine, AI lacks mental states and thus cannot fulfill the mental state 
(mens rea) elements built into most criminal offenses. Therefore, 
convicting AI of crimes requiring a mens rea like intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness would violate the principle of legality. This principle stems 
from general rule of law values and holds that it would be contrary to 
law to convict a defendant of a crime unless it is proved (following 
applicable procedures and by the operative evidentiary standard) that 
the defendant satisfied all the elements of the crime.124 If punishing AI 
 
 121 See Chalmers, supra note 53, at 201 (describing phenomenal experiences as those 
personally felt or experienced).  
 122 See id. (discussing the hard problem of consciousness).  
 123 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 124 See Husak & Callender, supra note 71, at 32-33. 
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violates the principle of legality, it threatens the rule of law and could 
weaken the public trust in the criminal law.  
The broad form of the challenge holds that because AI lacks the 
capacity to deliberate and weigh reasons, AI cannot possess broad 
culpability of the sort that criminal law aims to respond to.125 A 
fundamental purpose of the criminal law is to condemn culpable 
wrongdoing, as it is at least the default position in criminal law doctrine 
that punishment may be properly imposed only in response to culpable 
wrongdoing.126 The capacity for culpable conduct thus is a general 
prerequisite of criminal law, and failing to meet it would remove the 
entity in question from the ambit of proper punishment — a fact that is 
encoded in law, for example, in incapacity defenses like infancy and 
insanity. Thus, the broad version of the Eligibility Challenge holds that 
because AI lacks the practical reasoning capacities needed for being 
culpable, AI does not fall within the scope of criminal law. Punishing 
AI despite its lack of capacity would not only be conceptually confused, 
but would fail to serve the retributive aims of criminal law — namely, 
to mark out seriously culpable conduct for the strictest public 
condemnation.  
Here we develop three answers to the Eligibility Challenge.  
1. Answer 1: Respondeat Superior 
The simplest answer to the Eligibility Challenge has been deployed 
with respect to corporations. Corporations are artificial entities that 
might also be thought ineligible for punishment because they are 
incapable of being culpable in their own right.127 However, even if 
corporations cannot literally satisfy mens rea elements, criminal law has 
 
 125 See generally Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 456-57 (2012) (distinguishing narrow culpability as merely 
mens rea categories from broad culpability, which is the underlying normative defect 
that criminal law aims to respond to).  
 126 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962); see also MICHAEL S. 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 35 (1997) (arguing 
for a presumption in favor of punishing “all and only those who are morally culpable in 
the doing of some morally wrongful action”); DUFF, REALM, supra note 74, at 20 (a legal 
system “that criminalizes conduct that is not even alleged to be . . . wrongful is, 
necessarily, a perversion of criminal law”). While strict liability crimes exist, these are 
only justified in exceptional circumstances and are otherwise unjust. See W. Robert 
Thomas, On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for Criminal Intent in 
an Intent-Free Moral World, 110 MICH. L. REV. 647, 647-50 (2012). 
 127 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367-69 (2009) (arguing against corporate 
punishment). 
ABBOTT SARCH MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019 2:24 PM 
2019] Punishing Artificial Intelligence 129 
developed doctrines that allow culpable mental states to be imputed to 
corporations. The most important such doctrinal tool is respondeat 
superior, which allows mental states possessed by an agent of the 
corporation to be imputed to the corporation itself provided that the 
agent was acting within the scope of her employment and in furtherance 
of corporate interests.128 Some jurisdictions also tack on further 
requirements.129 Since imputation principles of this kind are well-
understood and legally accepted, thus letting actors guide their behavior 
accordingly, respondeat superior makes it possible for corporations to 
be convicted of crimes without violating the principle of legality.130  
If this kind of legal construction of mental states is a promising 
mechanism by which corporations can be brought back within the 
ambit of proper punishment and avoid the Eligibility Challenge, the 
same legal device could be used to make AI eligible for punishment. The 
culpable mental states of AI developers, owners, or users could be 
imputed to the AI under certain circumstances pursuant to a respondeat 
superior theory.131 
It may be more difficult to use respondeat superior to answer the 
Eligibility Challenge for AI than for corporations — at least in cases of 
Hard AI Crime. Unlike a corporation, which is literally composed of the 
humans acting on its behalf, an AI is not guaranteed to come with a 
 
 128 See Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal Liability Versus Corporate Securities 
Fraud Liability: Analyzing the Divergence in Standards of Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
157, 157 (2009) (“[R]espondeat superior has been the most traditionally accepted 
method of imputing criminal liability to a corporation.”); Eli Lederman, Models for 
Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation Toward 
Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 654-55 (2000) 
(explaining that under respondeat superior, “a corporation is liable for the deeds of any 
of its agents or employees . . . as long as . . . [t]he agent was acting within the course 
and scope of his or her employment, having the authority to act for the corporation . . . 
at least in part in furtherance of the corporation’s business interests” (internal 
alterations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 129 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (adopting respondeat 
superior but restricting it to the mental states of high corporate officials). 
 130 Granted, this is a legal fiction. But the principle of legality does not obviously 
require that corporations literally — as opposed to legally — satisfy the mens rea 
element. See Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 611-12 
(1984). Even if one thinks imputation principles are in tension with the principle of 
legality, strictly construed, the costs we normally fear from violating it — like 
weakening public trust in criminal law — are not likely to be very serious. So even if 
corporations’ literal lack of mental states were to remain a formalistic problem for 
corporate punishment, it would not be a very weighty one. 
 131 See Hallevy, supra note 10, at 201 (arguing “there is no substantive legal 
difference between the idea of criminal liability imposed on corporations and on AI 
entities”). 
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ready supply of identifiable human actors whose mental states can be 
imputed.132 This is not to say there will not also be many garden-variety 
cases where an AI does have a clear group of human developers. Most 
AI applications are likely to fall within this category and so respondeat 
superior would at least be a partial route to making AI eligible for 
punishment. Of course, in many of these cases when there are 
identifiable people whose mental states could be imputed to the AI — 
such as developers or owners who intended the AI to cause harm — 
criminal law will already have tools at its disposal to impose liability on 
these culpable human actors. In these cases, there is less likely to be a 
need to impose direct AI criminal liability. 
Thus, while respondeat superior can help mitigate the Eligibility 
Challenge for AI punishment in many cases, this is unlikely to be an 
adequate response in cases of Hard AI Crime.  
2. Answer 2: Strict Liability 
A different sort of response to the Eligibility Challenge is to look for 
ways to punish AI despite its lack of a culpable mental state. That is not 
to simply reach for a consequentialist justification133 of the conceptual 
confusion or inaptness involved in applying criminal law to AI. Within 
criminal law, we take this to be a justificatory strategy of last resort — 
especially given the blunt form of consequentialism it relies on. Rather, 
what is needed is a method of cautiously extending criminal law to AI 
that would not entail weighty violations of the principle of legality.  
One way to do this would be to establish a range of new strict liability 
offenses specifically for AI crimes — i.e., offenses that an AI could 
commit even in the absence of any mens rea like intent to cause harm, 
knowledge of an inculpatory fact, reckless disregard of a risk or 
negligent unawareness of a risk. In this sense, the AI would be subject 
to liability without “fault.” This would permit punishment of AI in the 
absence of mental states. Accordingly, strict liability offenses may be 
one familiar route by which to impose criminal liability on an AI 
without sacrificing the principle of legality.  
 
 132 Although, Shawn Bayern has argued that existing American LLC statutes allow 
an organization not to be legally associated with human members. Shawn Bayern, Are 
Autonomous Entities Possible?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 23, 26 (2019). He argues on 
this basis that organizational statutes are thus flexible enough to give something like 
legal personhood to software systems, because an AI can also direct the activities of an 
organization. Id. 
 133 See supra notes 77–82 (explaining the idea of justifying punishment based on its 
good consequences). 
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Many legal scholars are highly critical of strict liability offenses. For 
example, as Duff argues, strict criminal liability amounts to unjustly 
punishing the innocent:  
That is why we should object so strongly . . . : the reason is not 
(only) that people are then subjected to the prospect of material 
burdens that they had no fair opportunity to avoid, but that they 
are unjustly portrayed and censured as wrongdoers, or that 
their conduct is unjustly portrayed and condemned as wrong.134  
Yet this normative objection applies with greatest force to persons. The 
same injustice does not threaten strict criminal liability offenses for AI 
because AI does not obviously enjoy the protections of the desert 
constraint135 (which prohibits punishment in excess of culpability).136 
This strategy is not without problems. Even to be guilty of a strict 
liability offense, defendants still must satisfy the voluntary act 
requirement.137 LaFave’s criminal law treatise observes that “a voluntary 
act is an absolute requirement for criminal liability.”138 The Model Penal 
Code, for example, holds that a “person is not guilty of an offense unless 
his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the 
omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.”139 
Behaviors like reflexes, convulsions or movements that occur 
unconsciously or while sleeping are expressly ruled out as non-
voluntary.140 To be a voluntary act, “only bodily movements guided by 
conscious mental representations count”.141 If AI cannot have mental 
states and is incapable of deliberation and reasoning, it is not clear how 
any of its behavior can be deemed to be a voluntary act.  
There are ways around this problem. The voluntary act requirement 
might be altered (or outright eliminated) by statute for the proposed 
class of strict liability offenses that only AI can commit. Less 
 
 134 DUFF, REALM, supra note 74, at 19. 
 135 There may be unfairness to adjacent innocent people who own or rely on the AI, 
but that is a separate problem which afflicts any punishment. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 136 Matters would be different if AIs, perhaps like many animals, could experience 
pleasure and pain, or were conscious or otherwise in possession of morally salient 
interests. It would indeed seem unfair to subject animals to extreme suffering just for 
general deterrent benefits (if not as unfair as for a human being). 
 137 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1(c) (3d ed. 2018) 
(“[C]riminal liability requires that the activity in question be voluntary.”). 
 138 Id.  
 139 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 140 See id. § 2.01(2). 
 141 Gideon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174, 175 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). 
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dramatically, even within existing criminal codes, it is possible to define 
certain absolute duties of non-harmfulness that AI defendants would 
have to comply with or else be guilty by omission of a strict liability 
offense. The Model Penal Code states that an offense cannot be based 
on an omission to act unless the omission is expressly recognized by 
statute or “a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by 
law.”142 A statutory amendment imposing affirmative duties on AI to 
avoid certain kinds of harmful conduct is all it would take to enable an 
AI to be strictly liable on an omission theory.  
Of course, this may also carry costs. Given that one central aim of 
criminal law is usually taken to be responding to and condemning 
culpable conduct, if AI is punished on a strict liability basis, this might 
risk diluting the public meaning and value of the criminal law.143 That 
is, it threatens to undermine the expressive benefits that supposedly help 
justify punishing AI in the first place.144 This is another potential cost 
to punishing AI that must be weighed against its benefits.  
3. Answer 3: A Framework for Direct Mens Rea Analysis for AI 
The last answer is the most speculative. A framework for directly 
defining mens rea terms for AI — analogous to those possessed by 
natural persons — could be crafted. This could require an investigation 
of AI behavior at the programming level and offer a set of rules that 
courts could apply to determine when an AI possessed a particular mens 
rea — like intent, knowledge or recklessness — or at the very least, 
when such a mens rea could be legally constructed.145 This inquiry 
could draw on expert testimony about the details of the AI’s code, 
though it need not. By way of analogy, juries assess mental states of 
human defendants by using common knowledge about what mental 
states (intentions, knowledge, etc.) it takes to make a person behave in 
the observed fashion.146 Similarly, in AI cases, experts might need only 
 
 142 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).  
 143 See DUFF, REALM, supra note 74, at 19-20.  
 144 See supra Part II.B. 
 145 In Part III.A, we discussed respondeat superior as a mode of taking an existing 
human mental state and carrying it over to an AI. This section, by contrast, discusses 
possible methods of legally constructing AI mental states that no person already 
possesses. Cf. infra note 164 (discussing the collective knowledge doctrine for 
corporations). 
 146 See generally Peter Carruthers, Mindreading in Infancy, 28 MIND & LANGUAGE 141, 
143 (2013) (discussing how infants attribute beliefs and intentions to others); David 
Premack & Guy Woodruff, Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?, 1 BEHAV. BRAIN 
SCI. 515, 515 (1978) (defining “theory of mind” as the system whereby “the individual 
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to testify in broad terms about how the relevant type of AI (say, a neural 
network) functions and how its information-processing architecture 
could have generated the observed behavior. Thus, direct mens rea 
analysis for AI could, but need not, require “looking under the hood” at 
the details of the code. Instead, it would be enough to simply guide the 
legal determination of what mens rea the AI can be deemed to possess.  
Towards this end, a framework is needed to steer decision-makers in 
conducting direct mens rea analysis for AI, and it must consist of two 
parts. First, to answer the broad Eligibility Challenge, we need a general 
conception of what it would mean for AI to be culpable in its own right. 
Second, to answer the narrow version of the challenge, we need to offer 
a set of rules for when an AI may be deemed to possess a given mens rea.  
To begin with, a coherent concept of AI culpability could be legally 
constructed in the following way. The prevailing theory holds that a 
person is criminally culpable for an action to the extent that he or she 
manifests insufficient regard for legally protected interests or values.147 
These protected interests and values provide legally recognized reasons 
bearing on how to behave. Insufficient regard is a form of ill will or 
indifference that produces mistakes in the way one recognizes, weighs, 
and responds to the applicable legal reasons for action.148 The criminal 
 
imputes mental states to himself and to others” and noting that it is “not directly 
observable [but] can be used to make predictions . . . about the behavior of other 
organisms”). 
 147 See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 62, at 67-68 (2009) (“[I]nsufficient concern 
[is] the essence of culpability.”); Peter K. Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 L. 
& PHIL. 289, 374-75 (2006) (“[A] person is normatively blameworthy for engaging in 
conduct that a statute prohibits if he was motivated by an attitude of disrespect for the 
interests that the statute seeks to protect . . . .”); see also VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 250 (2005) (“[I]f [a defendant] is convicted of a serious offence, the state 
communicates . . . that [his] behaviour manifested an inappropriate regard for other 
citizens and their interests . . . .”); Gideon Yaffe, Intoxication, Recklessness, and 
Negligence, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 545, 552-53 (2012).  
 148 See, e.g., GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 38 (2010) (an action is culpable to the degree 
that “it is a product of a faulty mode of recognition or response to reasons for action”). 
Note that legal culpability may or may not be the same as moral blameworthiness. 
Compare Mark Dsouza, Criminal Culpability After the Act, 26 KING’S L.J. 440, 453 (2015) 
(distinguishing moral from legal culpability), and Sarch, Who Cares, supra note 17, at 
710, with Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 29, 30-
31 (1990) (taking moral and legal culpability to be presumptively the same). We are 
agnostic on how to understand moral blameworthiness, which may be more fine-
grained and searching of one’s inner mental states than legal culpability. Compare Pete 
Graham, A Sketch of a Theory of Blameworthiness, 88 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 
388, 403 (2014) (“[W]hat people are truly blameworthy for are the motivations from 
which [their] actions spring, rather than the actions themselves.”), with NOMY ARPALY 
& TIMOTHY SCHROEDER, IN PRAISE OF DESIRE 170 (2014) (defending a notion of 
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law typically does not demand that we are motivated by respect for 
others, or even respect for law; all it demands is that we do not put our 
disrespect on display by acting in ways that are inconsistent with 
attaching proper weight to protected interests and values. Thus, 
criminal culpability can be seen as being more about what one’s 
behavior manifests and less about the nuances of one’s private 
motivations, thoughts, and feelings.149 There are good institutional 
design reasons — such as clarity, the need for the law to be able to guide 
the conduct of normal citizens, and the demand for the law not to 
intrude too heavily into the private sphere — for criminal law not to be 
overly concerned with the specific motives or private mental states 
involved in law-breaking. Thus, as long as one crosses the line and has 
no affirmative defense, we may treat the presumption that one’s illegal 
action manifests insufficient regard as being unrebutted — i.e., as 
legally conclusive. 
By way of analogy, this notion of culpability can account for corporate 
culpability. If only the legal notion of criminal culpability is required 
for proper punishment, then eligibility for punishment requires being 
capable of behaving in ways that manifest insufficient regard for the 
legally recognized reasons. All that avoiding legal culpability requires is 
to abstain from actions that are reasonably interpreted as disrespectful 
forms of conduct stemming from a legally deficient appreciation of the 
legal reasons.150 This provides a recipe for how to regard corporations 
as being criminally culpable in their own right. They possess 
information-gathering, reasoning, and decision-making procedures in 
virtue of the hierarchy of employees they are made up of. Thus, 
corporations can be seen as having the capacity for criminal culpability. 
Through their members, they weigh and act on the reasons that criminal 
law demands not displaying insufficient regard for in action.151 
 
blameworthiness that is similar to criminal culpability as described here). Our focus 
here, regardless, is legal culpability. 
 149 See Sarch, Who Cares, supra note 17, at 709-10. 
 150 See GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2018) (developing an evidentialist account of manifestation 
of insufficient regard); see also Sarch, Who Cares, supra note 17, at 727-33. 
 151 See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY 158-63 (2011) (arguing that 
corporations can have decision-making structures that satisfy the main preconditions 
for responsibility); W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and Responsibility of Corporate Law 
to Improve Criminal Punishment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 601, 612-13 (2017) (“Corporations 
have free will in a narrow sense: they can deliberate and act consistent with their self-
identified interests and separate from outside pressures. Corporations are willing 
participants in . . . our normative practices, even if they may not be objects of moral 
consideration in . . . themselves. For example, through contract law, corporations 
routinely participate in a normatively laden practice akin to promising.”).  
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Corporations can engage in conduct that puts on display their 
insufficient regard for the legally recognized interests of others. For 
example, if a corporation learns, through its employees, that its 
manufacturing processes generate dangerous waste that is seeping into 
the drinking water in the nearby town, this is a legally recognized reason 
for the corporation to alter its conduct. If the corporation continues its 
manufacturing activities unchanged, this demonstrates — through its 
information-sharing and decision-making procedures — that it did not 
attach sufficient weight to the legally recognized reasons against 
continuing its dangerous activities. This is paradigmatic criminal 
culpability.152  
AI could qualify as criminally culpable in an analogous manner. 
Sophisticated AI may have built-in goals with a greater or lesser 
autonomy to determine the means of completing those goals.153 AI may 
gather information, process it, and determine the most efficient means 
to accomplish its goals.154 Accordingly, the law might deem some AIs to 
possess the functional equivalent of sufficient reasoning and decision-
making abilities to manifest insufficient regard. If the AI is programmed 
to be able to take account of the interests of humans and consider legal 
requirements, but ends up behaving in a way that is inconsistent with 
taking proper account of these legally recognized interests and reasons, 
then the AI can be reasonably seen as manifesting insufficient regard — 
which is to say, be deemed in law to be criminally culpable.155 
 
 152 One might object that a corporation’s practical reasoning and decision-making 
capacities merely derive from, or are composed out of, those of the corporation’s 
members. However, this is merely a worry about reducibility. See infra Part III.B. It does 
not undermine corporations’ threshold eligibility for punishment. See Thomas, supra 
note 151, at 613 (noting that if “corporate attitudes derive from the contributions of 
individuals who themselves are uncontroversially moral agents . . . it would be 
surprising that every emergent corporate attitude would be stripped of normative 
content”). 
 153 See supra notes 31–48. 
 154 See id. 
 155 This idea is similar in some respects to Hu’s argument that robots may be 
punished only if they possess “moral algorithms.” See Hu, supra note 15, at 496. These 
are “algorithms that are capable of making nontrivial morally relevant decisions,” (i.e., 
ones that “concern[] a choice between or among two or more courses of actions that 
might be considered right or wrong by ordinary members of our society.”). Id. As Hu 
notes, these could be taken on the basis of strict rules, guiding principles or an effort to 
weigh the competing interests at play in order to determine what would maximize some 
expected utility function. See id. at 497-98; see also id. at 505 (considering the analogy 
between corporate moral responsibility and similar responsibility for AI). Unlike Hu, 
our arguments do not assume or require that AI are moral persons or have moral 
responsibility. We are concerned with legal culpability, the demands of which are less 
exacting than true moral responsibility.  
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This gives a flavor of how criminal culpability might broadly be 
understood for AI, but we still need a framework for determining when 
sophisticated AIs can be said to possess a functional analog of a standard 
mens rea-like purpose or knowledge. We do not attempt here to 
formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for an AI mens rea, but 
rather to sketch some possible approaches.  
Work in the Philosophy of Action characterizing the functional role 
of human intentions could be extended to AI. On Bratman’s well-known 
account,156 actors who intend (i.e., act with the purpose) to bring about 
an outcome “guide [their] conduct in the direction of causing” that 
outcome.157 This means that in the normal case, “one [who intends an 
outcome] is prepared to make adjustments in what one is doing in 
response to indications of one’s success or failure in promoting” that 
outcome.158 Suppose an actor is driving with the intention to hit a 
pedestrian. In that case, if the actor detects that conditions have 
changed so that behavioral adjustments are required to make this 
outcome more likely, then the actor will be disposed to make these 
adjustments. Moreover, actors with this intention will be disposed to 
monitor the circumstances to find ways to increase the likelihood of the 
desired outcome. Merely foreseeing the outcome, but not intending it, 
does not similarly entail that one will guide one’s behavior in these ways 
to promote the outcome in question (i.e., make it more likely).  
This conception of intention could be applied to AI. One conceivable 
way to argue that an AI (say, an autonomous vehicle) had the intention 
(purpose) to cause an outcome (to harm a pedestrian) would be to ask 
whether the AI was guiding its behavior so as to make this outcome more 
likely (relative to its background probability of occurring). Is the AI 
monitoring conditions around it to identify ways to make this outcome 
more likely? Is the AI then disposed to make these behavioral 
adjustments to make the outcome more likely (either as a goal in itself 
or as a means to accomplishing another goal)? If so, then the AI 
plausibly may be said to have the purpose of causing that outcome. 
Carrying out this sort of inquiry will of course require extensive and 
technically challenging expert testimony regarding the nature of the 
programming — and could thus be prohibitively difficult or expensive. 
 
 156 See Michael E. Bratman, What Is Intention?, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 15, 
23-27 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990); see also Alex Sarch, Double Effect and the 
Criminal Law, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 453, 467-68 (2015). 
 157 Bratman, supra note 156, at 26. 
 158 See id.  
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But it does not seem impossible in principle, even if difficult questions 
remain.159  
Similar strategies may be developed for arguing that an AI possessed 
other mens rea, like knowledge. For example, on dispositional theories, 
knowledge may be attributed to an actor when the actor has a 
sufficiently robust set of dispositions pertaining to the truth of the 
proposition — such as the disposition to assent to the proposition if 
queried, to express surprise and update one’s plans if the proposition is 
revealed to be false, to behave consistently with the truth of the 
proposition, or to depend on it carrying out one’s plans.160 In criminal 
law, knowledge is defined as practical certainty.161 Thus, if we extend 
the above dispositional theory to AI, there is an argument for saying an 
AI knows a fact, F, if the AI displays a sufficiently robust set of 
dispositions associated with the truth of F — such as the disposition to 
respond affirmatively if queried (in a relevant way) whether F is 
practically certain to be true, or the disposition to revise plans upon 
receiving information showing that F is not practically certain, or the 
disposition to behave as if F is practically certain to be true. If enough 
 
 159 For example, suppose the autonomous vehicle is actually aiming not to harm 
pedestrians by hitting them, but rather aims for something that merely correlates with 
hitting pedestrians — such as reducing the amount of shadows objects cast on the 
streets (as fewer shadows increases other metrics of reliable driving, which is the car’s 
primary goal). Should this be construed as intentionally hitting the pedestrians, or 
merely hitting them knowingly? This is a familiar problem from criminal law theory 
and philosophy of action. See, e.g., Adam Feltz & Joshua May, The Means/Side-Effect 
Distinction in Moral Cognition: A Meta-Analysis, 166 COGNITION 314-17 (2017). We need 
not resolve this difficult question here to establish our main point that it is possible to 
make progress on extending mens rea terms to AI. Nonetheless, by analogy, we suspect 
this case would plausibly be construed as intentionally hitting the pedestrian as a means 
to the self-driving car’s other goals. If the AI regulates its conduct to make hitting 
pedestrians more likely, this is not simply a “foreseen byproduct” of the AI behavior, 
but something it pursues as a means to accomplishing its deeper aims. Intending harm 
as a means suffices for showing purpose in the criminal law. If you kill a relative merely 
as the means to getting your inheritance, the killing still is purposeful. Alternatively, 
perhaps the “intended as a means/foreseen as a side-effect” distinction should be 
jettisoned as unworkable.  
 160 See Belief, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 3, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/belief/#1.2 (“Traditional dispositional views of belief assert that for someone to 
believe some proposition P is for [her] to possess [relevant] behavioral dispositions 
pertaining to P. Often cited is the disposition to assent to utterances of P in [appropriate] 
circumstances . . . . Other relevant dispositions might include the disposition to exhibit 
surprise should the falsity of P [become] evident, the disposition to assent to Q if . . . 
shown that P implies Q, and the disposition to depend on P’s truth in [acting]. [More 
generally, this amounts to] being disposed to act as though P is the case.”).  
 161 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (defining knowledge 
as practical certainty). 
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of these dispositions are proven, then knowledge that F could be 
attributed to the AI.162 One could take a similar approach to arguing 
that recklessness is present as well, as this requires only awareness that 
a substantial risk of harm is present — i.e., knowledge that the risk has 
a mid-level probability of materializing (below practical certainty).163  
Finally, as an alternative to direct arguments for showing AI mens rea, 
one could develop new imputation rules for AI. For example, one might 
follow the model of the collective knowledge doctrine, which identifies 
culpable interference with the flow of information within an 
organization and uses this as the basis for pretending as if the 
organization itself “knew” the facts it prevented itself from learning.164 
The idea as applied here would be to take culpable conduct by the AI’s 
developers and use this as the basis for pretending the AI possessed a 
culpable mens rea itself. For example, if AI developers were reckless (or 
negligent) in their design, testing or production, and the AI goes on to 
cause harm, this could provide an argument for treating the AI itself as 
if it were reckless (or negligent) as to the harm caused.  
Although much more needs to be said for such arguments to be 
workable,165 it at least suggests that it may be possible to develop a set 
of legal doctrines by which courts could deem AIs to possess the mens 
rea elements of crimes.  
B. Further Retributivist Challenges: Reducibility and Spillover 
Even assuming AI is eligible for punishment, two further culpability-
focused challenges remain. The first concerns the reducibility of any 
putative AI culpability, while the second concerns spillover of AI 
punishment onto innocent people nearby. This Section offers answers 
to both. 
 
 162 Cf. Eric Schwitzgebel, In-Between Believing, 51 PHIL. Q. 76 (2001) (defending this 
approach to determining when to attribute beliefs to humans).  
 163 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (defining 
recklessness). 
 164 See United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(embracing one version of collective knowledge doctrine); ALEXANDER SARCH, 
CRIMINALLY IGNORANT 246 (2019) (defending the collective knowledge doctrine as an 
equal culpability imputation rule for corporations). 
 165 Among other problems there may not be deterrence benefits to punishing 
autonomous vehicles that hit pedestrians due to code that could be reconstructed as 
embodying a culpable maxim (like “if you flip me off then I run you over”), but 
withholding such punishment from unexplainable machine learning code that results 
in the same thing. Why the latter should not generate independent liability while the 
former would seems to be a distinction without a normative difference. 
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1. Reducibility 
One might object that there is never a genuine need to punish AI 
because any time an AI seems criminally culpable in its own right, this 
culpability can always be reduced to that of nearby human actors — 
such as developers, owners, and users. The law could target the relevant 
culpable human actors instead. 
This objection has been raised against corporate punishment too. 
Skeptics argue that corporate culpability is always fully reducible to 
culpable actions of individual humans.166 Any time a corporation does 
something intuitively culpable — like causing a harmful oil spill 
through insufficient safety procedures — this can always be fully 
reduced to the culpability of the individuals involved: the person 
carrying out the safety checks, the designers of the safety protocols, or 
the managers pushing employees to cut corners in search of savings. 
For any case offered to demonstrate the irreducibility of corporate 
culpability,167 a skeptic may creatively find additional wrongdoing by 
other individual actors further afield or in the past to account for the 
apparent corporate culpability.168  
This worry may not be as acute for AI as it is for corporations. AI 
seems able to behave in ways that are more autonomous from its 
developers than corporations are from their members. Corporations, 
after all, are simply composed of their agents (albeit organized in 
particular structures). Also, AI may sometimes behave in ways that are 
less predictable and foreseeable than corporate conduct.  
Nonetheless, there are ways to block the reducibility worry for 
corporate culpability as well as AI. The simplest response is to recall 
that it is legal culpability we are concerned with, not moral 
blameworthiness. Specifically, it would be bad policy for criminal law 
 
 166 See, e.g., Andras Szigeti, Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility 
Morally Deficient?, in INSTITUTIONS, EMOTIONS, AND GROUP AGENTS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 329 (2014) (Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid eds., 
2013) (arguing that the individualist analysis does not leave any responsibility-deficit 
that would require a genuine group culpability). 
 167 Consider List and Pettit’s notion of a “responsibility deficit.” LIST & PETTIT, supra 
note 151, at 165. Perhaps “the individuals are blamelessly ignorant [or] act under such 
felt pressure that they cannot be held fully responsible for their contribution to a bad 
outcome; they can each argue that the circumstances mitigate their personal . . . 
responsibility.” Id. If the individuals have lowered culpability, then the total culpability 
for the group harm might seem greater than the sum of individual culpability. Whether 
such responsibility deficits can really arise, however, remains debatable. After all, when 
the individuals are excused, might that lower the total amount of blame to be attributed 
for the group harm? 
 168 See id. at 158. 
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to always allow any putative corporate criminal culpability to be 
reduced to individual criminal liability. This would require 
criminalizing very minute portions of individual misconduct — 
momentary lapses of attention, the failure to perceive emerging 
problems that are difficult to notice, tiny bits of carelessness, mistakes 
in prioritizing time and resources, not being sufficiently critical of 
groupthink, and so on. Mature legal systems should not criminalize 
infinitely fine-grained forms of misconduct, but rather should focus on 
broader and more serious categories of directly harmful misconduct 
that can be straightforwardly defined, identified, and prosecuted. 
Criminalizing all such small failures — and allowing law enforcement 
to investigate them — would be invasive and threatening to values like 
autonomy and the freedom of expression and association.169 It would 
also increase the risk of abuse of process. Instead, we should expect 
“culpability deficits”170 in any well-designed system of criminal law, and 
this in turn creates a genuine need for corporate criminal culpability as 
an irreducible concept. 
Similar reasoning could be employed for AI culpability. There is 
reason to think it would be a bad system that encouraged law 
enforcement and prosecutors to, any time an AI causes harm, invasively 
delve into the internal activities of the organizations developing the AI 
in search of minute individual misconduct — perhaps even the slightest 
negligence or failure to plan for highly unlikely exigencies. The criminal 
justice system would be disturbingly invasive if it had to create a 
sufficient number of individual offenses to ensure that any potential AI 
culpability can always be fully reduced to individual crimes. Hence, 
where AI is concerned, we do not think the Reducibility Challenge — 
at least as applied to legal culpability — imposes a categorical bar to 
punishing AI. 
2. Spillover 
A final retributivist challenge to punishing AI is the “spillover 
problem,” again familiar from the corporate context.171 Because 
corporate punishments (usually in the form of fines) amount to a hit to 
the corporation’s bottom line, these punishments inevitably spill over 
 
 169 Cf. HART, supra note 70, at 1-27.  
 170 See LIST & PETTIT, supra note 151, at 165 (defending “responsibility deficits” as 
creating a need for irreducible corporate accountability). 
 171 See Thomas, supra note 151, at 619. 
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onto innocent shareholders.172 This might seem to violate the desert 
constraint against the state harming people in excess of their desert. The 
same objection has been raised against punishing AI. Mulligan worries 
that “[o]ne could . . . imagine situations where the notion of separating 
a rogue robot from its owner [or damaging or restricting the robot in 
punishing it] would create a disproportionate burden on the owner, for 
example if a robot was unique, unusually expensive relative to the harm 
caused, or difficult to replace.”173 This is just a version of the spillover 
problem. If the AI system unforeseeably causes harm, it may seem unfair 
or disproportionate to its innocent owner or operator to damage the AI 
system in punishment. 
There are familiar responses to the spillover objection for 
corporations. First, one might contend that spillover does not qualify as 
punishment because it is not imposed on a shareholder for her 
offense.174 Nonetheless, this definitional answer is somewhat 
unsatisfying, as there clearly are strong reasons for the state not to 
knowingly harm innocent bystanders even if the harm does not strictly 
count as punishment.  
A better answer is that spillover is not a special problem for corporate 
or AI punishment. Most forms of punishment — including punishment 
of individual wrongdoers — has the potential to harm the innocent, as 
when a convicted person has dependent children. Spillover objections 
may simply expose general problems with criminal law. The fact that 
punishment tends to harm the innocent suggests a need to reform 
criminal law as well as prisons, reentry programs and similar initiatives 
to lessen the collateral consequences of punishment of all types. In the 
corporate context, some have recently responded to the spillover 
objection by defending reforms to corporate punishments so the “pain” 
they impose is more accurately distributed to the culpable actors within 
the company who contributed to the crime.175 For example, Will 
Thomas argues that managers found to have contributed to a crime 
committed by the corporation should have their incentive 
compensation clawed back to satisfy the criminal fines that were levied 
against the corporation in the first instance.176 
 
 172 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 863 (2d ed. 1961) 
(noting that “a fine imposed on the corporation is in reality aimed against shareholders 
who are not . . . responsible for the crime, i.e., is aimed against innocent persons”). 
 173 Mulligan, supra note 9, at 594.  
 174 See HART, supra note 70, at 4-5. 
 175 See Thomas, supra note 151, at 647. 
 176 See id. at 647-49. 
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Similar thinking applies to AI punishment, which likewise should be 
narrowly tailored. Destroying an AI, for example, would be a blunt 
remedy that is more likely to harm the innocent. More tailored remedies 
might be implemented instead, such as reprogramming the AI, or civil 
remedies directed at responsible persons. In such ways, the punishment 
of AI systems could be crafted to minimize the spillover effects. Further, 
spillover may be less of a concern in the case of Hard AI Crime, where 
there may be little nexus between AI punishment and harm to innocent 
individuals. Even here, spillover could be largely addressed through 
well-designed mechanisms like the ex-ante creation of a financially 
responsible party or creation of a fund to cover criminal liability as a 
condition of operation the AI system (akin to criminal liability 
insurance). We explore such implementation ideas further in the next 
Part. The spillover problem thus is not an absolute bar to AI 
punishment. It is an omnipresent problem with criminal punishment, 
which should be addressed for any novel mode of criminal punishment 
— whether for corporations or AI.  
C. Not Really Punishment? 
We end this Part by considering another challenge to AI punishment 
— that AI cannot be truly “punished.” Even if an AI was convicted of 
an offense and subject to negative treatment — such as being 
reprogrammed or terminated — this may not be punishment under our 
working definition. On Hart’s definition introduced in Part I.C, 
punishment “must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant.”177 However, AI cannot experience things as 
being painful or unpleasant.178  
A first response is to argue that AI punishment does satisfy Hart’s 
definition because prong (i) requires only that the treatment in question 
must be “normally considered unpleasant” — not that it be actually 
unpleasant or unwelcome to a convicted party. This is what allows 
Hart’s definition to accommodate people who, for idiosyncratic reasons, 
do not experience their sentence as unpleasant or bad and to still regard 
this as punishment. The mere fact that a convicted party overtly wants 
to be imprisoned, like the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Bering 
Breivik, who wanted to be convicted and imprisoned to further his 
political agenda, does not mean that doing so pursuant to a conviction 
 
 177 See HART, supra note 70, at 4. 
 178 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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ceases to be punishment.179 Something similar might be said for AI as 
well as defendants who may be physically or psychologically incapable 
of experiencing pain or distress. Having one’s actions frozen or being 
terminated really are the kind of thing that can “normally be considered 
unpleasant.”  
This response can be developed further. Why might punishment need 
to be normally regarded as unpleasant? Why does it still seem to be 
punishment, for example, to imprison a person who in no way 
experiences it as unpleasant or unwelcome? The answer may be that 
defendants can have interests that are objectively set back even when 
they do not experience these setbacks as painful, unpleasant or 
unwelcome.180 Some philosophers argue it is intrinsically bad for 
humans to have their physical or agential capacities diminished — 
regardless of whether this is perceived as negative.181 If correct, this 
suggests that what prong (i) of Hart’s definition, properly understood, 
requires is that punishment involve events that objectively set back 
interests, and negative subjective experiences are merely one way to 
objectively set back interests. 
Can an AI have interests that are capable of being set back? AI is not 
conscious in the phenomenal sense of having subjective experiences 
and thus cannot experience anything as painful or unpleasant.182 
However, one could maintain that being incapacitated or destroyed is 
objectively bad for AIs even if the AI does not experience it as such — 
in much the same way that things like nutrition, reproduction, or 
physical damage can be said to be good or bad for biological entities like 
plants or animals.183 Some philosophers argue that it is in virtue of 
 
 179 See Anders Breivik Found Sane: The Verdict Explained, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 24, 2012, 
10:15 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/9496641/ 
Anders-Breivik-found-sane-the-verdict-explained.html (discussing why Breivik would 
“want to be sent to prison” rather than getting the benefit of an insanity defense). 
 180 See Guy Fletcher, A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being, 25 
UTILITAS 206, 206 (2013) (defending objective theories of well-being from familiar 
objections); Alexander Sarch, Multi-Component Theories of Well-Being and Their 
Structure, 93 PAC. PHIL. Q. 439, 439-41 (defending a partially objective theory of well-
being, where both subjective experiences and some objective components can impact 
well-being). 
 181 See Elizabeth Harman, Harming As Causing Harm, in HARMING FUTURE PERSONS 
137, 139 (Melinda A. Roberts & David T. Wasserman eds., 2009) (arguing that an event 
harms an agent when that event causes P to be in an intrinsically bad state, where such 
states include “pain, mental or physical discomfort, disease, deformity, disability, or 
death”). 
 182 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 183 See PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS 26 (2001) (noting that “features of plants 
and animals have what one might call an ‘autonomous’, ‘intrinsic’, or as I shall say 
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something’s having identifiable functions that things can be good or bad 
for it. Most notably, Philippa Foot defends this sort of view (tracing it 
to Aristotle) when she argues that the members of a given species can 
be evaluated as excellent or defective by reference to the functions that 
are built into its characteristic form of life.184 From this evaluation as 
flourishing or defective, facts about what is good or bad for the entity 
can be derived. Thus, if having interests in this broad, function-based 
sense is all that is required for punishment to be sensible, then perhaps 
AI fits the bill. AIs also have a range of functions — characteristic 
patterns of behavior needed to continue in good working order and 
succeed at the tasks it characteristically undertakes. If living organisms 
can in a thin sense be said to have an interest in survival and 
reproduction, ultimately in virtue of their biological programming, then 
arguably an AI following digital programming could have interests in 
this thin sense as well.  
Other philosophers reject this view, however. They insist that only 
those entities capable of having beliefs and desires, or at least 
phenomenal experiences such as of pleasure and pain, can truly be said 
to have full-blooded interests that are normatively important. Legal 
philosopher Joel Feinberg took the capacity for cognition as the 
touchstone full-blooded interests, that is as a precondition for having 
things really be good or bad for us.185 He notes “we do say that certain 
conditions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for plants” (unlike rocks), but he denies 
that they have full-blooded interests.186 Although “Aristotle and 
Aquinas took trees [and plants] to have their own ‘natural ends’” (in 
much the same sense that Foot argues for), Feinberg denies plants “the 
status of beings with interests of their own” because “an interest, 
however the concept is finally to be analyzed, presupposes at least 
rudimentary cognitive equipment.”187 Interests, he thinks, “are 
compounded out of desires and aims, both of which presuppose 
 
‘natural’ goodness and defect that may have nothing to do with the needs or wants of 
the members of any other species of living thing”). 
 184 See id. at 33 (“The way an individual should be is determined by what is needed 
for development, self-maintenance, and reproduction: in most species involving 
defence, and in some the rearing of the young . . . . Thus, evaluation of an individual 
living thing in its own right, with no reference to our interests or desires, is possible [by 
reference to the functions of the thing, as captured in] Aristotelian categoricals (life-
form descriptions relating to the species)”). 
 185 See Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 49-51 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974).  
 186 Id. at 51. 
 187 Id. at 52. 
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something like belief, or cognitive awareness.”188 Since AIs are not 
literally capable of cognitive awareness (notwithstanding the discussion 
in Part III.A of how mens rea might be imputed), they cannot literally 
possess full-blooded interests of the kind Feinberg has in mind.189  
Thus, the pertinent question for present purposes is what sense of 
interest an entity must have for it to be intelligible to talk of punishing 
it — the thin sense of function-based interests of the kind Foot defended 
or the full-blooded, attitudinally-based interests Feinberg had in mind? 
This is ultimately a question about how to understand prong (i) of 
Hart’s definition of punishment, and one that goes to the heart of what 
criminal law is and what it is for. We simply note that this is one 
possible way of defending the idea of AI punishment as sensible.  
A different, perhaps stronger, type of reply is to distinguish between 
conviction and punishment, where the latter covers the sentence to which 
the convicted party is subject. Even if no form of treatment can count 
as punishment unless the entity in question experiences it negatively, 
this is not a precondition for a conviction. Perhaps for it to be intelligible 
to convict X of an offense, it is only required that X acted in ways that 
violated a prohibition and this can be sensibly construed as culpable (a 
manifestation of insufficient regard). If so, then one might accept that 
while punishing AI is not conceptually possible, applying criminal law 
to AIs, so they could be convicted of offenses, is. Thus, society might 
still benefit from AI convictions while not running afoul of the 
conceptual confusion that results from purporting to punish AIs.  
Convicting AIs may require, or allow, subjecting other parties to 
punishment in place of the AI. Criminal law roundly rejects “vicarious 
punishment” where people are concerned190 — not least where it risks 
the injustice of strict criminal liability imposed on innocent actors.191 
Corporate punishment might seem to involve vicarious punishment 
when officers or employees of the corporation are made to suffer due to 
the criminal fines imposed on the corporation. However, such cases are 
better understood not as vicarious liability, strictly speaking, but as 
convicting the corporation of an offense directly and then allowing the 
 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. at 49-50 (arguing that an entity cannot have full-blooded interests if it has 
“no conative life: no conscious wishes, desires, and hopes; or urges and impulses; or 
unconscious drives, aims, and goals; or latent tendencies, direction of growth, and 
natural fulfillments”).  
 190 See Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 680 (1968) (“[S]urely 
there is no going back to [collective punishment] . . . . On the contrary, the changes 
that have come with modern times have dictated quite inevitably that [individual 
punishment] replace [collective punishment].”). 
 191 See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
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sentence to be distributed to the different individuals out of which the 
corporation is made up.192 In the case of an AI, it could be argued that 
if human owners or users accept responsibility for operating the AI 
safely, then were the AI convicted of an offense in its own right, these 
responsible parties would be the appropriate persons to whom the 
sentence could be distributed by virtue of their voluntarily undertaking 
such responsibility. We explore a simple version of this idea further in 
the next Part. 
A final type of reply, always available as a last resort, is that even if 
applying criminal law to AIs is conceptually confused, it could still have 
good consequences to call it punishment when AIs are convicted. This 
would not be to defend AI punishment from within existing criminal 
law principles, but to suggest that there are consequentialist reasons to 
depart from them.  
IV. FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVES 
We have argued that punishing AI could have benefits and that doing 
so would not be ruled out by the negative limitations and retributive 
preconditions of punishment. But this does not yet show the 
punishment of AI to be justified. Doing so requires addressing the third 
main question in our theory of punishment: Would the benefits of 
punishing AI outweigh the costs, and would punishment be better than 
alternative solutions? These solutions might involve doing nothing, or 
relying on civil liability and regulatory responses, perhaps together with 
less radical or disruptive changes to criminal laws that target 
individuals. 
Ideally a cost-benefit analysis would involve more than identifying 
various costs and benefits, and would include quantitative analysis. If 
only a single Hard AI Crime is committed each decade, there would be 
far less need to address an AI criminal gap than if Hard AI Crime was a 
daily occurrence. The absence of evidence suggesting that Hard AI 
Crime is common counsels against taking potentially more costly 
actions now, but this balance may change as technological advances 
result in more AI activity.  
Section A focuses on Hard AI Crime, and finds that existing criminal 
law coverage will likely fall short. Section B argues that AI punishment 
has significant costs that suggest alternative approaches may be 
preferable. In Sections C and D, we map out some alternative 
approaches to managing AI crime. In particular, we examine moderate 
expansions of criminal law as well as tools available within civil law, 
 
 192 See Thomas, supra note 151, at 612-13. 
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and we argue that they have the resources to provide preferable 
solutions to the problem of Hard AI Crime. 
A. First Alternative: The Status Quo 
In considering the alternatives to direct punishment of AI, we begin 
with asking whether it would be preferable to simply do nothing. This 
section answers that existing criminal law falls short: there is an AI 
criminal gap. The impact of this gap is an empirical question we do not 
attempt to answer here.  
1. What the AI criminal gap is not: reducible harmful conduct by AI  
We begin by setting aside something that will not much concern us: 
cases where responsibility for harmful AI conduct is fully reducible to 
the culpable conduct of individual human actors. A clear example 
would be one where a hacker uses AI to steal funds from individual 
bank accounts. There is no need to punish AI in such cases, because 
existing criminal offenses, like fraud or computer crimes, are sufficient 
to respond to this type of behavior.193  
Even if additional computer-related offenses must be created to 
adequately deter novel crimes implemented with the use of AI, criminal 
law has further familiar tools at its disposal, involving individual-
focused crimes, which provide other avenues of criminal liability when 
AI causes foreseeable harms. For example, as Hallevy observes, cases of 
this sort could possibly be prosecuted under an innocent “agency 
model” (assuming AI can sensibly be treated as meeting the 
preconditions of an innocent agent, even if not of a fully criminally 
responsible agent in its own right).194 Under the innocent agency 
doctrine, criminal liability attaches to a person who acts through an 
agent who lacks capacity — such as a child or someone with an insanity 
defense. For instance, if an adult uses a five-year-old child to deliver 
illegal drugs, the adult rather than the child would generally be 
criminally liable.195 This could be analogous to a person programming 
a sophisticated AI to break the law: the person has liability for 
 
 193 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(7) (2019) (defining offenses such as computer 
trespass and computer fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud statute). 
 194 Hallevy, supra note 10, at 179-81.  
 195 See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation 
of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 372-73 (1985) (“Most criminal actions can readily be 
committed through the instrumentality of another person.”). 
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intentionally causing the AI to bring about the external elements of the 
offense.196  
This doctrine requires intent (or at least the knowledge) that the 
innocent agent will cause the prohibited result in question.197 This 
means that in cases where someone does not intend or foresee that the 
AI system being used will cause harm, the innocent agency model does 
not provide a route to liability. In such cases, one could instead appeal 
to recklessness or negligence liability if AI creates a foreseeable risk of 
a prohibited harm.198 For example, if the developers or users of AI 
foresee a substantial and unjustified risk that an AI will cause the death 
of a person, these human actors could be convicted of reckless 
homicide.199 If such a risk was merely reasonably foreseeable (but not 
foreseen), then lower forms of homicide liability would be available.200 
Similar forms of recklessness or negligence liability could be adopted 
where the AI’s designers or users actually foresaw, or should have 
foreseen, a substantial and unjustified risk of other kinds of harms as 
well — such as theft or property damage.201  
Hallevy also discusses this form of criminal liability for AI-generated 
harms, calling it the “natural and probable consequences model” of 
liability.202 This is an odd label, however, since the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine generally applies only when the defendant is 
already an accomplice to — i.e., intended — the crime of another. More 
 
 196 One might have doubts about this model of liability, too. After all, if AI is merely 
a tool, one would simply prosecute the user of the AI on a direct liability model. 
However, if AI is to be analogized to some kind of autonomous actor, which could break 
the chain of causation, akin to a child perhaps, then the innocent agency model would 
seem more apt. In any case, we argued in Part III that AI might plausibly count as an 
agent at least for legal purposes. Therefore, we think it is not ruled out at least in 
principle that the innocent agency model of liability could be applied to actors who 
cause AI to produce criminally prohibited results.  
 197 See Peter Alldridge, The Doctrine of Innocent Agency, 2 CRIM. L. F. 45, 70-71 
(1990); 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2019) (“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which [is 
a crime] is punishable as a principal.”). This intent requirement for innocent agency is 
similar to complicity liability, used where the actor assists or encourages another full-
fledged agent with capacity to do a crime, which also requires intent or knowledge by 
the accomplice that the principal actor will do the crime. Rosemond v. United States, 
572 U.S. 65, 79-80 (2014) (clarifying mens rea for complicity). 
 198 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (defining 
recklessness and negligence).  
 199 See id. § 210.3(a) (recklessly causing death suffices for manslaughter). 
 200 See id. § 210.4 (negligent homicide). 
 201 See, e.g., id. § 220.1(2) (reckless burning or exploding); id. § 220.2(2) (risking 
catastrophe); id. § 220.3 (criminal mischief). 
 202 See Hallevy, supra note 10, at 181-84. 
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specifically, the “natural and probable consequences” rule provides that 
where A intentionally aided B’s underlying crime C1 (say theft), but 
then B also goes on to commit a different crime C2 (say murder), then 
A would be guilty of C2 as well, provided that C2 was reasonably 
foreseeable.203 
Despite his choice of label, Hallevy seems alive to this complication 
and correctly observes that there are two ways in which negligence 
liability could apply to AI-generated harms that are reasonably 
foreseeable. He writes:  
the natural-probable-consequence liability model [applied] to 
the programmer or user differ in two different types of factual 
cases. The first type of case is when the programmers or users 
were negligent while programming or using the AI entity but 
had no criminal intent to commit any offense. The second type 
of case is when the programmers or users programmed or used 
the AI entity knowingly and willfully in order to commit one 
offense via the AI entity, but the AI entity deviated from the plan 
and committed some other offense, in addition to or instead of 
the planned offense.204 
In either sort of scenario, there would be a straightforward basis for 
applying existing criminal law doctrines to impose criminal liability on 
the programmers or users of an AI that causes reasonably foreseeable 
harms. Thus, no AI criminal gap exists here. 
A slightly harder scenario involves reducible harms by AI that are not 
foreseeable, but this is still something criminal law has tools to deal 
with. Imagine hackers use an AI to drain a fund of currency, but this 
ends up unforeseeably shutting down an electrical grid which results in 
widespread harm. The hackers are already guilty of something — 
namely, the theft of currency (if they succeed) or the attempt to do so 
(if they failed). Therefore, our question here is whether the hackers can 
be convicted of any further crime in virtue of their causing harm 
through their AI unforeseeably taking down an electrical grid.205  
 
 203 The rule holds that the aider and abettor “of an initial crime . . . is also liable for 
any consequent crime committed by the principal, even if he or she did not abet the 
second crime, as long as the consequent crime is a natural and probable consequence 
of the first crime.” Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the 
Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1424 
(2002); see also United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopting 
natural or probable consequences doctrine). 
 204 Hallevy, supra note 10, at 184. 
 205 Compare this case to the one where some kids are illegally using fireworks in 
their back yard, and this causes a massive forest fire destroying many homes. Sure, they 
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At first sight, it might seem that the hackers would be in the clear for 
the electrical grid. They could argue that they did not proximately cause 
those particular harms. Crimes like manslaughter or property damage 
carry a proximate cause requirement under which the prohibited harm 
must at least be a reasonably foreseeable type of consequence of the 
conduct that the actors intentionally carried out.206 But in this case, 
taking down the electrical grid and causing physical harm to human 
victims were assumed to be entirely unforeseeable even to a reasonable 
actor in the defendant’s shoes. 
Criminal law has tools to deal with this kind of scenario, too. This 
comes in the form of so-called constructive liability crimes. These are 
crimes that consist of a base crime which require mens rea, but where 
there then is a further result element as to which no mens rea is 
required. Felony murder is a classic example.207 Suppose one breaks 
into a home one believes to be empty in order to steal artwork. Thus, 
one commits the base crime of burglary.208 However, suppose further 
that the home turns out not to be empty, and the burglar startles the 
homeowner who has a heart attack and dies. This could make the 
burglar guilty of felony murder.209 This is a constructive liability crime 
because the liability for murder is constructed out of the base offense 
(burglary) plus causing the death (even where this is unforeseeable). 
According to one prominent theory of constructive liability crimes, they 
are normatively justifiable when the base crime in question (burglary) 
typically carries at least the risk of the same general type of harm as the 
constructive liability element at issue (death).210 
 
can be convicted of any offenses, if any, related to illicitly using the fireworks. But can 
they also be convicted of offenses related to the massive forest fire and destroyed homes? 
 206 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (characterizing 
proximate or legal causation requirement using a “scope of the risk” test). 
 207 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5 (3d ed.) (explaining 
felony murder as the doctrine that “one whose conduct brought about an unintended 
death in the commission or attempted commission of a felony was guilty of murder”). 
 208 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (defining burglary). 
 209 See LAFAVE, supra note 207, § 14.5. 
 210 See A. P. Simester, Is Strict Liability Always Wrong?, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 
21, 45 (A. P. Simester ed., 2005) (arguing that constructive liability as to a result is 
justified when the result is risked by the base offense) (“Where the risk [of Y] is intrinsic 
[to D’s doing the base offense, X], there seems no difficulty about holding D responsible 
and culpable for Y.”). To the extent one has normative qualms about the inclusion of 
such strict liability elements, one could mitigate this worry by requiring the mens rea 
of negligence as to the further harm element — though that would prevent this kind of 
crime from being of any use when the further harm is unforeseeable, as it is stipulated 
to be in the cases in question here. 
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This tool, if extended to the AI case, provides a familiar way to hold 
the hackers criminally liable for unforeseeably taking down the 
electrical grid and causing physical harm to human victims.  
It may be beneficial to create a new constructive liability crime that 
takes a criminal act like the attempt to steal currency using AI as the 
base offense, and then taking the further harm to the electrical grid, or 
other property or physical harm, as the constructive liability element, 
which requires no mens rea (not even negligence) in order to be guilty 
of the more serious crime. This constructive liability offense, in a 
slogan, could be called Causing Harm Through Criminal Uses of AI.  
New crimes could be created to the extent there are not already 
existing crimes that fit this mold. Indeed, in the present example, one 
might think there are already some available constructive liability 
crimes. Perhaps felony murder fits the bill insofar as attempting to steal 
currency may be a felony, and the conduct subsequently caused 
fatalities. However, this tool would be of no avail in respect to the 
property damage caused. This is why a new crime like Causing Harm 
Through Criminal Uses of AI may be necessary. In any case, no AI 
criminal gap is present here because criminal law has familiar tools 
available for dealing with unforeseeable harms of this kind. 
2. What the AI criminal gap is: irreducible criminal conduct by AI 
Consider a case of irreducible AI crime inspired by RDS. Suppose an 
AI is designed to purchase class materials for incoming Harvard 
students, but, through being trained on data from online student 
discussions regarding engineering projects, the AI unforeseeably 
“learns” to purchase radioactive material on the dark web and has it 
shipped to student housing. Suppose the programmers of this “Harvard 
Automated Shopper” did nothing criminal in designing the system and 
in fact had entirely lawful aims. Nonetheless, despite the reasonable care 
taken by the programmers — and subsequent purchasers and users of 
the AI (i.e., Harvard) — the AI caused student deaths. 
In this hypothetical, there are no upstream actors who could be held 
criminally liable. Innocent agency is blocked as a mode of liability 
because the programmers, users and developers of the AI did not have 
the intent or foresight that any prohibited or harmful results would 
ensue — as is required for innocent agency to be available.211 Moreover, 
in the case of RDS, if the risk of the AI purchasing the designer drugs 
was not reasonably foreseeable, then criminal negligence would also be 
blocked. Finally, constructive liability is not available in cases of this 
 
 211 See supra notes 192–194 and accompanying text. 
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sort because there is no “base crime” — no underlying culpable conduct 
by the programmers and users of the AI — out of which their liability 
for the unforeseeable harms the AI causes could be constructed.  
One could imagine various attempts to extend existing criminal law 
tools to provide criminal liability for developers or users. Most 
obviously, new negligence crimes could be added for developers that 
make it a crime to develop systems that foreseeably could produce a risk 
of any serious harm or unlawful consequence, even if a specific risk was 
unforeseeable. The trouble is that this does not seem to amount to 
individually culpable conduct, particularly as all activities and 
technologies involve some risks of some harm. This expansion of 
criminal law would stifle innovation and beneficial commercial 
activities. Indeed, if there were such a crime, most of the early 
developers of the internet would likely be guilty of it.212 
B. The Costs of Punishing AI 
Earlier, we discussed some of the potential costs of AI punishment, 
including conceptual confusion, expressive costs, and spillover. Even 
aside from these, punishment of AI would entail serious practical 
challenges as well as substantial changes to criminal law. Begin with a 
practical challenge: the mens rea analysis.213 For individuals, the mens 
rea analysis is generally how culpability is assessed. Causing a given 
harm with a higher mens rea like intent is usually seen as more culpable 
than causing the same harm with a lower mens rea like recklessness or 
negligence.214 But how do we make sense of the question of mens rea 
for AI?  
Part III considered this problem, and argued that for some AI, as for 
corporations, the mental state of an AI’s developer, owner, or user could 
be imputed under something like the respondeat superior doctrine. But 
for cases of Hard AI Crime that is not straightforwardly reduced to 
human conduct — particularly where the harm is unforeseeable to 
designers and there is no upstream human conduct that is seriously 
unreasonable to be found — nothing like respondeat superior would be 
appropriate. Some other approach to AI mens rea would be required.  
 
 212 For related reasons, we would reject proposals to impose strict criminal liability 
on developers of AI that autonomously causes harms. Strict liability crimes for designers 
amounts to punishing the innocent. See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. 
 213 See supra Part III.A (discussing the Eligibility Challenge). 
 214 E.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be 
Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 195-96 (2003) (“The MPC views its four basic 
mental states or culpability terms as hierarchically ordered . . . .”). 
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A regime of strict liability offenses could be defined for AI crimes. 
However, this would require a legislative work-around so that AI are 
deemed capable of satisfying the voluntary act requirement, applicable 
to all crimes.215 This would require major revisions to the criminal law 
and a great deal of concerted legislative effort. It is far from an off-the-
shelf solution. Alternately, a new legal fiction of AI mens rea, vaguely 
analogous to human mens rea, could be developed, but this too is not 
currently a workable solution. This approach could require expert 
testimony to enable courts to consider in detail how the relevant AI 
functioned to assess whether it was able to consider legally relevant 
values and interests but did not weight them sufficiently, and whether 
the program has the relevant behavioral dispositions associated with 
mens rea-like intention or knowledge. In Part III.A, we tentatively 
sketched several types of argument that courts might use to find various 
mental states to be present in an AI. However, much more theoretical 
and technical work is required and we do not regard this as a first best 
option. 
Mens rea, and similar challenges related to the voluntary act 
requirement, are only some of the practical problems to be solved in 
order to make AI punishment workable. For instance, there may be 
enforcement problems with punishing an AI on a blockchain. Such AIs 
might be particularly difficult to effectively combat or deactivate.  
Even assuming the practical issues are resolved, punishing AI would 
still require major changes to criminal law. Legal personality is necessary 
to charge and convict an AI of a crime, and conferring legal personhood 
on AIs would create a whole new mode of criminal liability, much the 
way that corporate criminal liability constitutes a new such mode 
beyond individual criminal liability.216 There are problems with 
implementing such a significant reform.  
Over the years, there have been many proposals for extending some 
kind of legal personality to AI.217 Perhaps most famously, a 2017 report 
 
 215 See supra notes 137–142 and accompanying text. 
 216 See Thomas J. Bernard, The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
22 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3-4 (1984) (describing criminal law as having “always had as its 
primary concern the regulation of relationships between individual persons,” while for 
practical reasons the “legal fiction” of corporate personality — and later corporate crime 
— developed). 
 217 See, e.g., SAMIR CHOPRA & LAWRENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS 
ARTIFICIAL AGENTS (2011) (arguing that AI could and should be given legal personality 
in the near future); Asaro, supra note 104, at 169-86 (proposing a Turing test to decide 
if an AI agent that caused harm is legally fit to stand trial for a criminal offense); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 
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by the European Parliament called on the European Commission to 
create a legislative instrument to deal with “civil liability for damage 
caused by robots.”218 It further requested the Commission to consider 
“a specific legal status for robots,” and “possibly applying electronic 
personality” as one solution to tort liability.219 Even in such a 
speculative and tentative form this proposal proved highly 
controversial.220 
Full-fledged legal personality for AIs equivalent to that afforded to 
natural persons, with all the legal rights that natural persons enjoy, 
would clearly be inappropriate. To take a banal example, allowing AI to 
vote would undermine democracy, given the ease with which anyone 
looking to determine the outcome of an election could create AIs to vote 
for a particular candidate.221 However, legal personality comes in many 
flavors, even for natural persons such as children who lack certain rights 
and obligations enjoyed by adults. Crucially, no artificial person enjoys 
all of the same rights and obligations as a natural person.222 The best-
known class of artificial persons, corporations, have long enjoyed only 
a limited set of rights and obligations that allows them to sue and be 
sued, enter contracts, incur debt, own property, and be convicted of 
crimes.223 However, they do not receive protection under constitutional 
provisions, such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
 
(1992); Amanda Wurah, We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident, That All Robots Are 
Created Equal, 22 J. FUTURE STUD. 61 (2017).  
 218 Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at 
16 (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0005_ 
EN.pdf. 
 219 See id. at 18. 
 220 For instance, more than 150 AI “experts” subsequently sent an open letter to the 
European Commission warning that, “[f]rom an ethical and legal perspective, creating 
a legal personality for a robot is inappropriate whatever the legal status model.” Open 
Letter to the European Commission Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, ROBOTICS-
OPENLETTER.EU, http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2019). 
 221 Indeed, even without the right to vote, AI may have been used to attempt to 
undermine democracy. Bots have been employed to influence election outcomes, inflate 
online follower counts, spread fake news, or intimidate users expressing particular 
opinions. See, e.g., Nicole M. Radziwill & Morgan C. Benton, Evaluating Quality of 
Chatbots and Intelligent Conversational Agents, (Apr. 15, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.04579.pdf. More generally, a lot of online 
content is generated by AI. See id.  
 222 See S. M. Solaiman, Legal Personality of Robots, Corporations, Idols and 
Chimpanzees: A Quest for Legitimacy, 25 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 155 (2017).  
 223 Elvia Arcelia Quintana Adriano, The Natural Person, Legal Entity or Juridical 
Person and Juridical Personality, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 363, 365 (2015). The first 
U.S. federal criminal conviction of a company was United States v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson 
River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. 509 (1909). 
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Clause, and they cannot bear arms, run for or hold public office, marry, 
or enjoy other fundamental rights that natural persons do.224 Thus, 
granting legal personality to AI to allow it to be punished would not 
require AI to receive the rights afforded to natural persons, or even 
those afforded to corporations. AI legal personality could consist solely 
of obligations.  
Even so, any sort of legal personhood for AIs would be a dramatic 
legal change that could prove problematic.225 As discussed earlier, 
providing legal personality to AI could result in increased 
anthropomorphisms. People anthropomorphizing AI expect it to adhere 
to social norms and have higher expectations regarding AI 
capabilities.226 This is problematic where such expectations are 
inaccurate and the AI is operating in a position of trust. Especially for 
vulnerable users, such anthropomorphisms could result in “cognitive 
and psychological damages to manipulability and reduced quality of 
life.”227 These outcomes may be more likely if AI were held accountable 
by the state in ways normally reserved for human members of society. 
Strengthening questionable anthropomorphic tendencies regarding AI 
could also lead to more violent or destructive behavior directed at AI, 
such as vandalism or attacks.228 Further, punishing AI could also affect 
human well-being in less direct ways, such as by producing anxiety 
about one’s own status within society due to the perception that AIs are 
given a legal status on a par with human beings. 
Finally, and perhaps most worryingly, conferring legal personality on 
AI may lead to rights creep, or the tendency for an increasing number of 
rights to arise over time.229 Even if AIs are given few or no rights initially 
when they are first granted legal personhood, they may gradually 
acquire rights as time progresses. Granting legal personhood to AI may 
thus be an important step down a slippery slope. In a 1933 Supreme 
 
 224 See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 
243, 255 (1906) (“The liberty referred to in [the 14th] Amendment is the liberty of 
natural, not artificial, persons.”); see also Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 341 (2005). 
 225 Cf. Hu, supra note 15, at 527-28 (discussing whether recognizing legal 
personhood for “smart robots” would be harmful, and addressing a number of Ryan 
Calo’s concerns about anthropomorphizing robots or other AI entities). 
 226 See Jakub Zlotowski et al., Anthropomorphism: Opportunities and Challenges in 
Human–Robot Interaction, INT’L J. SOC. ROBOTICS 347, 352 (2014). 
 227 Damiano & Dumouchel, supra note 114, at 4.  
 228 Cf. Diamantis, supra note 113, at 2078-80. 
 229 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (2011) (defining “rights creep”). 
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Court opinion, for instance, Justice Brandeis warned about rights creep, 
and argued that granting corporations an excess of rights could allow 
them to dominate the State.230 Eighty years after that decision, Justice 
Brandeis’ concerns were prescient in light of recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, which significantly expanded the rights 
extended to corporations.231 Such rights, for corporations and AI, can 
restrict valuable human activities and freedoms. 
C. Second Alternative: Minimally Extending Criminal Law 
There are alternatives to direct AI punishment besides doing nothing. 
The problem of Hard AI Crime would more reasonably be addressed 
through minimal extensions of existing criminal law. The most obvious 
would be to define new crimes for individuals. Just as the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act criminalizes gaining unauthorized access or 
information using personal computers,232 an AI Abuse Act could 
criminalize malicious or reckless uses of AI. In addition, such an Act 
might criminalize the failure to responsibly design, deploy, test, train, 
and monitor the AIs one contributed to developing. These new crimes 
would target individual conduct that is culpable along familiar 
dimensions, so they may be of limited utility with regard to Hard AI 
Crimes that do not reduce to culpable actors. Accordingly, a different 
way to expand the criminal law seems needed to address Hard AI Crime.  
In cases of Hard AI Crime, a designated adjacent person could be 
punished who would not otherwise be directly criminally liable — what 
we call a Responsible Person. This could involve new forms of criminal 
negligence for failing to discharge statutory duties (perhaps relying on 
strict criminal liability) in order to make a person liable in cases of Hard 
AI Crime. It could be a requirement for anyone creating or using an AI 
 
 230 See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 231 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) 
(curtailing government’s ability to restrict political speech by companies). Citizens 
United held that the free speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from restricting independent expenditures for communications by 
companies. See id. at 341-43 (“The Court has recognized that First Amendment 
protection extends to corporations . . . . The Court has thus rejected the argument that 
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under 
the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”); 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (recognizing a for-profit 
company’s claim to religious belief). 
 232 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2019). 
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to ex ante register a Responsible Person for the AI.233 It could be a crime 
to design or operate AI capable of causing harm without designating a 
Responsible Person.234 This would be akin to the offense of driving 
without a license.235 The registration system might be maintained by a 
federal agency. However, a registration scheme is problematic because 
it is difficult to distinguish between AI capable of criminal activity and 
AI not capable of criminal activity, especially when dealing with 
unforeseeable criminal activity. Even simple and innocuous seeming AI 
could end up causing serious harm. Thus, it might be necessary to 
designate a Responsible Person for any AI. Registration might involve 
substantial administrative burden and, given the increasing prevalence 
of AI, the costs associated with mandatory registration might outweigh 
any benefits.  
A default rule rather than a registration system might be preferable. 
The Responsible Person could be the AI’s manufacturer or supplier if it 
is a commercial product. If it is not a commercial product, the 
Responsible Person could be the AI’s owner, developer if no owner 
exists, or user if no developer can be identified. Even non-commercial 
AIs are usually owned as property, although that may not always be the 
case, for instance, with some open source software. Similarly, all AIs 
have human developers, and in the event an AI autonomously creates 
another AI, responsibility for the criminal acts of an AI-created AI could 
reach back to the original AI’s owner. In the event an AI’s developer 
cannot be identified, or potentially if there are a large number of 
developers, again in the case of some open source software, 
responsibility could attach to an AI’s user. However, this would fail to 
catch the rare, perhaps only hypothetical, case of the non-commercial 
AI with no owner, no identifiable developer, and no user. To the extent 
that a non-commercial AI owner, developer, and user working together 
 
 233 A new criminal offense — akin to driving without a license — could be imposed 
for cases where programmers, developers, owners or users have unreasonably failed to 
designate a Responsible Person for an AI. 
 234 The Responsible Person should also be liable for harms caused by an AI where 
the AI, if a natural person, would be criminally liable together with another individual. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that sophisticated AI developers could create machines that 
cause harm but rely on co-conspirators to escape liability.  
 235 There is precedent for such a Responsible Person registration scheme. In the 
corporate context, executives may be required to attest to the validity of some SEC 
filings and held strictly liable for false statements even where they have done nothing 
directly negligent. If the Responsible Person is a person at a company where a company 
owns the AI, it would have to be an executive to avoid the problem of setting up a low-
level employee as “fall guy.” The SEC for this reason requires a C-level executive to 
attest to certain statements on filings. 
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would prefer a different responsibility arrangement, they might be 
permitted to agree to a different ex ante selection of the Responsible 
Person.236 That might be more likely to occur with sophisticated parties 
where there is a greater risk of Hard AI Crime. The Responsible Person 
could even be an artificial person such as a corporation.237  
It would be possible to impose criminal liability on the Responsible 
Person directly in the event of Hard AI Crime. For example, if new 
statutory duties of supervision and care were defined regarding the AI 
for which the Responsible Person is answerable, criminal negligence 
liability could be imposed on the Responsible Person should he or she 
unreasonably fail to discharge those duties. Granted, this would not be 
punishment for the harmful conduct of the AI itself. Rather, it would be 
a form of direct criminal liability imposed on the Responsible Person 
for his or her own conduct. 
More boldly, if this does not go far enough to address Hard AI Crime, 
criminal liability could also be imposed on the Responsible Person on a 
strict liability basis — particularly if the relevant punishments are only 
fines rather than incarceration. Generally, strict liability crimes are 
restricted to minor infractions or regulatory offenses or “violations,”238 
though some examples of more serious strict criminal liability can also 
be found (such as statutory rape in some jurisdictions).239 This could 
be defended by claiming that there is a special duty owed to society at 
large to provide special assurances that certain especially serious risks 
will be mitigated as much as possible.240 A Responsible Person accepting 
 
 236 It might also be likely that parties with more negotiating power would attempt to 
offload their liability. For instance, AI suppliers might attempt to shift liability to 
consumers. At least in the case of commercial products, it should not be possible for 
suppliers to do this. 
 237 This raises potential concerns about corporations with minimal capital being 
used to avoid liability. However, this same concern exists now with human activities, 
where thinly capitalized corporations are exploited as a way to limit the liability of 
individuals. Still, there are familiar legal tools to block this sort of illicit liability 
avoidance. To the extent a bad actor is abusing the corporate form, courts can, for 
instance, pierce the corporate veil. 
 238 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).  
 239 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25-50 (2001) (defining statutory rape offenses); 
Funari v. City of Decatur, 563 So. 2d 54, 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that an 
Alabama “statute which prohibits the selling of alcohol to minors does not contain any 
language requiring knowledge or intent,” and “the very purpose of the statute clearly 
indicates a legislative intent to impose strict liability”). 
 240 Cf. DUFF, ANSWERING, supra note 91, at 170 (suggesting in the mala prohibitum 
context that “we owe it to each other not merely to ensure that we act safely, but to 
assure each other that we are doing so, in a social world in which we lack the personal 
knowledge of others that could give us that assurance”).  
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strict criminal liability could serve this function. Especially in the case 
of AI where user trust is critical to realizing the benefits of AI, this 
approach could be warranted to combat the perception that unsafe AI 
is being employed. Accordingly, AI could become another context in 
which strict criminal liability on the Responsible Person is imposed. 
Yet we have serious reservations about strict liability crimes applied 
to persons.241 If justifiable at all, they can only be justifiably used as a 
last resort in exigent circumstances — as in cases of unusually 
dangerous activities. However, it is not obvious that the use of AI 
qualifies as unusually dangerous. To the contrary, in many areas of 
activity it would be unreasonable not to use AI, as when safety can be 
improved over human actors such as may soon be the case with self-
driving cars.242 Most bad human actors using AI systems to commit 
crimes will still be caught under existing criminal laws, and so far there 
have not been high-profile cases of Hard AI Crimes. As a result, we are 
not yet convinced that Hard AI Crime is a significant enough social 
problem to merit the use of strict criminal liability. 
At the end of the day, a Responsible Person regime accompanied by 
new statutory duties, which carry criminal penalties if these duties are 
negligently or recklessly breached, provides an attractive approach to 
dealing with Hard AI Crime. While it is only a minimal expansion of 
criminal law, by expressing condemnation through a criminal 
conviction of the Responsible Person, much of the expressive benefit 
from a direct conviction AI can be achieved — but without as serious a 
loss of public trust as the legal fictions needed to punish AI directly 
could create.  
D. Third Alternative: Moderate Changes to Civil Liability 
A further alternative to dealing with Hard AI Crime is to look to the 
civil law, primarily tort law, as a method of both imposing legal 
accountability and deterring harmful AI. Some AI crime will no doubt 
already result in civil liability, however, if existing civil liability falls 
short, new liability rules could be introduced. A civil liability approach 
could even be used in conjunction with expansions to criminal liability. 
 
 241 See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1075-76 (1997) (discussing retributive views that denounce strict 
liability) (“Strict liability appears to be a straightforward case of punishing the 
blameless, an approach that might have consequential benefits but is unfair on any 
retrospective theory of just deserts.”). 
 242 See, e.g., Abbott, The Reasonable Computer, supra note 49. 
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While it is beyond the scope of this Article to canvas gaps in civil 
liability for AI crime, it is worth noting that existing civil liability 
frameworks come with built-in limitations. Very few laws specifically 
address AI-generated harms, which means civil liability must usually be 
established under a traditional negligence or product liability 
framework or under contractual liability.243 Negligence generally 
requires a person to act carelessly, so where this cannot be established 
there may be no recovery. Product liability may require both that an AI 
is a commercial product (e.g., this may not apply where AI is just 
software or the use of AI is a “service”), and that there be a defect in the 
product (or that its properties are falsely represented).244 In the case of 
complex AI, it may be difficult to prove a defect, and AI may cause harm 
without a “defect” in the product liability sense. For these reasons, the 
European Commission has created Expert Groups to determine 
whether new technologies necessitate a revision of the Product Liability 
Directive, which harmonizes product liability across the European 
Union, and whether even more ambitious changes are needed.245 Civil 
liability may also derive from contractual relationships, but this usually 
only applies where there is privity of contract between parties, and it 
may also have significant limitations.246  
To the extent there is inadequate civil liability for Hard AI Crimes, 
the Responsible Person proposal sketched above could be repurposed 
so that the Responsible Person might only be civilly liable. The case 
against a Responsible Person could be akin to a tort action if brought by 
an individual or a class of plaintiffs, or a civil enforcement action if 
brought by a government agency tasked with regulating AI. At trial, an 
AI would not be treated like a corporation, where the corporation itself 
is held to have done the harmful act and the law treats the company as 
a singular acting and “thinking” entity. Rather, the question for 
adjudication would be whether the Responsible Person discharged his 
or her duties of care in respect of the AI in a reasonable way — or else 
civil liability could also be imposed on a strict liability basis (a less 
troubling prospect than it is within criminal law). 
A Responsible Person scheme is not the only solution to inadequate 
civil liability for Hard AI Crimes. An insurance scheme is another 
 
 243 See, e.g., id. 
 244 See, e.g., id.  
 245 See, e.g., Register of Commission Expert Groups and Other Similar Entities: Group 
Details - Commission Expert Group, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jun. 17, 2019), 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail& 
groupID=3592. 
 246 See Abbott, The Reasonable Computer, supra note 49, at 15-16. 
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approach.247 Owners, developers, or users of AI, or just certain types of 
AI, could pay a tax into a fund to ensure adequate compensation for 
victims of Hard AI Crime. The cost of this tax would be relatively minor 
compared to the financial benefits of AI. This could either replace the 
Responsible Person solution or apply to cases where no appropriate 
Responsible Person exists. An AI compensation fund could operate like 
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“VICP”).248 
Vaccines create widespread social benefits but are known in rare cases 
to cause serious medical problems. VICP is a no-fault alternative to 
traditional tort liability that compensates individuals injured by a VICP-
covered vaccine. It is funded by a tax on vaccines that is paid by users.249 
Other models for insurance schemes exist, such as the Price Anderson 
Act for nuclear power, which establishes a pool of funds to compensate 
victims in the event of a nuclear incident through a chain of indemnity 
regardless of who was ultimately at fault. 250  
E. Concluding Thoughts  
This Article has argued that, confronted with the growing possibility 
of Hard AI Crime, we should not overreact and reach for the radical tool 
of punishing AI. Alternative approaches could provide substantially 
similar benefits and would avoid many of the pitfalls and difficulties 
involved in punishing AI. A natural alternative, we argued, involves 
modest expansions to criminal law, including, most importantly, new 
negligence crimes centered around the improper design, operation, and 
testing of AI applications as well as possible criminal penalties for 
designated parties who fail to discharge statutory duties. Expanded civil 
liability could supplement this framework. 
We took a careful look at how a criminal law regime that punished 
AI might be constructed and defended. In so doing, we showed that it 
is all too easy to underestimate the ability of criminal law theory to 
accommodate substantial reforms. We explored the ways in which 
 
 247 Indeed, New Zealand has replaced tort law with a publicly funded insurance 
scheme to compensate victims of accidents. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-
Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 187-90 (observing that New Zealand “abolished the 
most important areas of tort law more than three decades ago” in favor of an insurance 
scheme that awards compensation to victims on a no-fault basis).  
 248 See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERV. 
ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 
2019). 
 249 See id. 
 250 See The Price-Anderson Act, BACKGROUND INFO. (Cent. For Nuclear Sci. & Tech. 
Info., La Grange Park, Ill.), Nov. 2005. 
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criminal law can — and, where corporations are involved, already does 
— appeal to elaborate legal fictions to provide a basis within the 
defensible boundaries of criminal law theory for punishing some 
artificial entities. We showed what a system of punishment for AI might 
look like and showed how some hasty arguments against it can be 
answered. 
The use of legal fictions to solve difficult conceptual questions or 
practical problems — such as how to conceptualize or prove particular 
sorts of mental elements for AI or misbehavior by its developers — gives 
criminal law theory impressive plasticity. Legal fictions help turn the 
criminal law into a pragmatic tool for solving social problems. 
Nonetheless, legal fictions must be used with caution, as their overuse 
risks eroding public trust and weakening the rule of law. Moreover, 
allowing legal fictions to proliferate unchecked can lead to widespread 
injustice either through punishing the innocent or by punishing more 
harshly than one’s culpability calls for. While some legal fictions can be 
justified,251 they must be used judiciously. For this reason, there is and 
should be an onerous burden to meet before we can be confident that a 
particular legal fiction — such as legal personality for AI or the 
invention of culpable mental states for AI — is adopted. Embracing legal 
fiction without meeting this justificatory burden would be tantamount 
to believing in science fiction. 
 
 251 See SARCH, supra note 164, at 141 (defending certain restricted uses of particular 
legal fictions based on culpably preserving ignorance). 
